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ABSTRACT

Scottish nationalism has always been part of the political debate in the
United Kingdom since the birth of the Union in 1707. In the 1880s, inspired by
Irish Home Rule, Scottish nationalists began to demand greater autonomy from
London. To appease the nationalists, London began devolving small amounts of
power to Scotland. However, this small amount of devolution was not enough for
the Scots. In 1967, the Labour Government of Harold Wilson responded to the
growth of Scottish nationalism by proposing more devolution. It would not be until
1999 under the Tony Blair Labour Government that Scotland would experience its
greatest form of devolution with the creation of the Scottish Parliament at
Holyrood. The purpose of this thesis is to determine if post-1999 devolution has
impacted Scottish national identity. In particular, it explores whether or not
devolution has led to an increase in the number of individuals attributing
themselves with a dual national identity. The rise in the number of individuals
attributing themselves with a dual national identity is important because these
individuals are less likely to support independence compared to those that identify
solely as Scottish. To examine the impact of devolution on national identity,
Scottish Social Attitude Surveys from ScotCen Social Research were used. This
thesis also compared its results with findings from previous research on Scottish
national identity in the pre-1999 devolution period, as well as with how individuals
voted in the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum. Finally, it predicts the
outcome of a potential second referendum on Scottish independence.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Since the Act of Union in 1707, there has been a growth in Scottish nationalism.1
This nationalism has led to questions of whether or not Scotland should remain part of
the United Kingdom. To address nationalistic tendencies in Scotland, the Labour
Government passed the Scotland Act of 1978 to further devolve power to Scotland in the
hopes of quelling nationalism.2 Two decades later, Tony Blair and his Labour
Government would enact the Scotland Act of 1998, allowing for the most significant
period of devolution from Westminster to Scotland. This Act led to the creation of the
Scottish Parliament at Holyrood.3 The aim of this thesis is to determine if Blair’s
devolution has impacted national identity and support for Scottish independence. To
answer this question, this thesis will examine the impact of devolution and the creation of
the Scottish Parliament on national identity in Scotland between 1999 and 2013 or what
this thesis calls the post-devolution period. If the British government wishes to keep the
Union together, devolution may be the tool required to achieve that aim.
To further examine how devolution is impacting national identity, a breakdown of
seven key demographic categories are assessed. These variables include age, gender,
1

Gordon Donaldson et al., Government and Nationalism in Scotland, ed. James N. Wolfe (Edinburgh,
United Kingdom: Edinburgh University Press, 1969), 4.
2
Colin R. Munro, “Scottish Devolution: Accommodating a restless nation,” International Journal on
Minority and Group Rights 6, no. ½ (1998): 110-111,
http://journals1.scholarsportal.info.ezproxy.uwindsor.ca/pdf/13854879/v6i1-2/97_sdaarn.xml.
3
Vernon Bogdanor, Devolution in the United Kingdom (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University
Press, 1999), 201-202; Michael O’Neill, Devolution and British Politics, ed. Michael O’Neill (Harlow,
United Kingdom: Pearson Education Limited, 2004), 174; Vernon Bogdanor, The Blair Effect: The Blair
Government 1997-2001, ed. Anthony Seldon (London, United Kingdom: Little, Brown and Company,
2001), 150-151; Peter Lynch, Scottish Government and Politics: An Introduction (Edinburgh, United
Kingdom: Edinburgh University Press, 2001), 16.
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education, location, employment status, religion, and political party preference. In
addition to studying national identity, this thesis examines feelings towards independence
in the post-devolution period. Essentially, this thesis argues that devolution will decrease
support for Scottish independence by causing an increase in the number of individuals
that attribute themselves with a dual national identity. It has been found that individuals
that attribute themselves with a dual national identity are less likely to support
independence.4 If the results of this thesis are in line with the hypothesis, then it will
validate the Labour Party’s theory that devolution can keep the Union together.
To conduct this research, ScotCen Social Research, which is an independent
research organization that is located in Edinburgh, Scotland, was used. It is part of
NatCen Social Research, which is the largest research organization in Britain.5 To
determine trends in national identity from ScotCen Social Research, surveys called the
Scottish Social Attitude Surveys are used. The survey data was provided by What
Scotland Thinks, which is run by ScotCen Social Research. The surveys are conducted
through one-on-one interviews.6 These surveys use the Moreno question for the purposes
of determining state and regional forms of self-identification.7 For Scotland, researchers
ask respondents to choose from five separate identities: “Are you Scottish, not British;
more Scottish than British; equally Scottish and British; more British than Scottish; or
4

Anthony Heath and James Kellas, “Nationalism and Constitutional Questions,” Scottish Affairs 25, no. 2
(1998): 118, http://www.euppublishing.com/doi/pdfplus/10.3366/scot.1998.0070.
5
“FAQs,” ScotCen Social Research Official Website, http://www.scotcen.org.uk/taking-part/faqs/; “About
What Scotland Thinks,” What Scotland Thinks Official Website, http://whatscotlandthinks.org/about-whatscotland-thinks.
6
“FAQs,;” “Scottish Social Attitudes,” ScotCen Social Research Official Website,
http://www.scotcen.org.uk/our-research/research/scottish-social-attitudes/.
7
See Luis Moreno, “Decentralisation in Britain and Spain: The Cases of Scotland and Catalonia,” (PhD
Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1986); Luis Moreno, “Scotland, Catalonia, Europeanization and the
‘Moreno Question,’” Scottish Affairs 54, no. 1 (2006): 11,
http://www.euppublishing.com/doi/pdfplus/10.3366/scot.2006.0002.
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British, not Scottish.”8 For the purposes of this thesis, “more Scottish than British,”
“equally Scottish and British,” and “more British than Scottish,” were combined into one
category called “dual national identity.” The category of “Scottish, not British” was
renamed to “just Scottish identity.”
Respondents were also asked about their feelings towards Scottish independence.
They were asked if they feel Scotland should be “independent, separate from the United
Kingdom and the European Union; independent, separate from the United Kingdom but
in the European Union; part of the United Kingdom, with an elected Parliament that has
some taxation powers; part of the United Kingdom, with an elected Parliament that has
no taxation powers; or part of the United Kingdom without its own elected Parliament.”9
For this thesis, individuals that selected “independent, separate from the United Kingdom
and the European Union” and “independent, separate from the United Kingdom but in the

8

“Moreno National Identity,” Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys from What Scotland Thinks 1999-2013,
http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/moreno-national-identity-5#table.
9
“How should Scotland be governed? (five options) broken down by 'Urban or rural area (six categories)'
All years (2002- 2013),” Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys 2002-2013 from What Scotland Thinks,
http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-should-scotland-be-governed-five-options5/explore/urindsc2/#explore; “How should Scotland be governed? (five options) broken down by 'Sex' All
years (1999-2013),” Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys 1999-2013 from What Scotland Thinks,
http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-should-scotland-be-governed-five-options5/explore/rsex/#explore; “How should Scotland be governed? (five options) broken down by 'Religion' All
years (1999- 2013),” Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys 1999-2013 from What Scotland Thinks,
http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-should-scotland-be-governed-five-options5/explore/RelgSumS/#explore; “How should Scotland be governed? (five options) broken down by 'Party
political identification' All years (1999- 2013),” Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys 1999-2013 from What
Scotland Thinks, http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-should-scotland-be-governed-five-options5/explore/partyid/#explore; “How should Scotland be governed? (five options) broken down by 'Main
economic activity ' All years (1999- 2013),” Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys 1999-2013 from What
Scotland Thinks, http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-should-scotland-be-governed-five-options5/explore/REconSum/#explore; “How should Scotland be governed? (five options) broken down by
'Education' All years (1999- 2013),” Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys 1999-2013 from What Scotland
Thinks, http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-should-scotland-be-governed-five-options5/explore/HEdQual/#explore; “How should Scotland be governed? (five options) broken down by 'Age
group' All years (1999- 2013),” Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys 1999-2013 from What Scotland Thinks,
http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-should-scotland-be-governed-five-options5/explore/RAgeCat/#explore.
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European Union” were combined into one category called “independence from the
United Kingdom.” This thesis also placed individuals that selected “part of the United
Kingdom, with an elected Parliament that has some taxation powers” and “part of the
United Kingdom with an elected Parliament that has no taxation powers” into one
category called “devolution.” The category of “part of the United Kingdom without its
own elected Parliament” was renamed to “no devolution.” Similar to national identity,
data from the Scottish Social Attitude Surveys was used.
In addition, this thesis will also show that the theoretical approach of new
institutionalism helps explain this trend. This thesis will also help fill three gaps in the
literature. Firstly, the research in this thesis will expand the knowledge by examining up
to the year 2013. Most of the literature that evaluates the impact of devolution on
nationalism in Scotland tends to stop at 2006. Secondly, this thesis will examine how
devolution is impacting nationalism by examining the national identity of individuals in
seven key demographic categories. Most research neglects the evaluation of national
identity of individuals in different demographic categories. And thirdly, this thesis will
use new institutionalism to help explain the link between the devolved Scottish
Parliament and national identity. Most research that studies devolution and national
identity tends to overlook this theory.
This thesis will also compare national identity in the pre- and post-1999
devolution periods. To determine if a trend in national identity existed prior to the 1999
devolution, a comparison was completed using previous research and the results from this
thesis. It is important to note that it appears that 1992 was the first year where the Moreno

4

question was employed in a survey.10 A comparison between the results of this thesis and
voting patterns in the 2014 Scottish independence referendum were also conducted. More
specifically, this thesis will determine if its results match how individuals actually voted
in the referendum. A breakdown of voting within some demographic groups is also
provided. In order to do this, data from various polling and news agencies, such as Lord
Ashcroft, Scottish Referendum Study, the Daily Record, the Daily Mail, Graphic News,
The Telegraph, and The Guardian will be used. Finally, this thesis will also predict how
Brexit will affect the outcome of a potential second referendum on Scottish
independence. To make this prediction, various data from scholars such as John Curtice
and Charles Pattie and Ron Johnson was used. The next section of this chapter will
discuss the history that led up to the formation of Scotland.

The History of Scotland
From the first Christian century until the fifth century, Britain was a province of
the Roman Empire. However, the Roman Empire did not have full control of the entire
island. Roman power only sometimes extended into what is known today as Scotland.
For the most part, Scotland had very few interactions with the Roman Empire because the
Romans had very little interest in that part of the island. However, between the years 71
and 74, the Romans began to focus more attention on Scotland.11 Julius Agricola, the

10

See John Curtice, “A Stronger or Weaker Union? Public Reactions to Asymmetric Devolution in the
United Kingdom,” Publius 36, no. 1 (2006): 95-113, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20184944;
Alison Park et al., Is devolution strengthening or weakening the UK? (London, United Kingdom: Sage
Publications, 2001); Ross Bond and Michael Rosie, “National Identities in Post-Devolution Scotland,”
Scottish Affairs 40, no. 1 (2002), http://www.euppublishing.com/doi/pdfplus/10.3366/scot.2002.0035.
11
Robert L. Mackie, A Short History of Scotland, ed. Gordon Donaldson (Edinburgh and London, United
Kingdom: Oliver and Boyd, 1962), 1.

5

Roman Governor in Britain, decided to send soldiers into Scotland.12 To do this, Agricola
utilized two routes. The first route was through the east and the second route was through
the west. After securing the east and the west of Scotland, Agricola set his sights on Perth
in the year 83.13 To ensure victory, Agricola ordered the construction of Inchtuthil, a
fortified camp at the entrance of Strathmore. This camp would become the base of
operations for farther advancement into Scotland.14
In the year 84, a move by Agricola brought his soldiers face to face with a large
native force. This native force was composed of several Caledonian tribes that lived in
the Scottish Highlands. Led by chieftain Calgacus, who was the first native of Scotland,
the Caledonian tribes would be no match for the Romans. This victory allowed Agricola
to assume control of most of Scotland. Agricola and his successors would continue to
hold this territory for about thirty-two years.15
By the year 115, the Roman Empire started to quickly lose Scottish territory to
northern tribes. In fact, the northern tribes were so successful in liberating areas from the
Romans that by the year 122, Emperor Hadrian himself would go to Britain in order to
help restore Roman control. Although he was successful in regaining control, Hadrian
decided that Scotland was not worth the trouble to maintain.16 Hadrian relinquished
control of Scotland and declared that the northern boundary of Britain would be the line
of stone forts between Tyne and the Solway. Later, the Romans decided to build a large

12

Gordon Menzies, Who are the Scots? (London, United Kingdom: The British Broadcasting Corporation,
1971), 35.
13
Mackie, A Short History of Scotland, ed. Gordon Donaldson, 1..
14
Ibid., 2; Graham Ritchie and Anna Ritchie, Scotland: Archaeology and early history (London, United
Kingdom: Thames and Hudson Limited, 1981), 121-125.
15
Mackie, A Short History of Scotland, ed. Gordon Donaldson, 2.
16
Ibid.
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stone wall at this location. They claimed that the wall would separate the peaceful south
from the unconquered north. This wall is called Hadrian’s Wall.17 This boundary between
the south and the north would not remain static.
During the reign of Emperor Antoninus Pius in the year 140, the Governor of the
Province of Britain, Lollius Urbicus, ordered Roman soldiers to re-enter Scotland.18 Once
in Scotland, the soldiers were instructed to create a rampart at the Forth and Clyde,
pushing the boundary of Britain further north. Once the rampart was complete, soldiers
then constructed forts to further ensure that the south was protected from the north.
Although the wall was built, it did not guarantee protection from the tribes on the other
side.19
In the year 154, northern tribes were successful in forcing the Romans to abandon
their defensive line at the Forth and Clyde. Although the Romans were able to push back,
in the year 185, the northern tribes were successful again in forcing the Romans to
abandon their defensive line at the Forth and Clyde. As the last Roman solider
disappeared over the slopes of the Cheviots, the northern tribes believed that they had
finally liberated their land from the Romans.20 However, this liberation would be shortlived.
Roman soldiers would re-enter Scotland in the year 208. Under the Emperor
Septimius Severus, Roman soldiers sailed into the Forth and docked at a deserted harbour

17

Ibid., 2-3.
Ritchie and Ritchie, Scotland: Archaeology and early history, 126.
19
Mackie, A Short History of Scotland, ed. Gordon Donaldson, 3.
20
Ibid.
18

7

in Cramond.21 Once in Scotland, Severus ordered his soldiers into the Fifa and northeastern Scotland. Although Severus was successful in retaking sections of Scotland, his
plan to retake the north was abandoned after his death in the year 211. From this point,
the boundary for the Roman Province of Britain would revert back to Hadrian’s Wall and
fighting between the Romans and the northern tribes halted. In fact, many of the
inhabitants of Scotland engaged in trading goods with the Roman Province.22 This
relationship resulted in a peaceful phase for both the Province of Britain and Scotland.23
However, this peaceful phase would come to an end around the year 368. Rome
itself was under attack, so many of the soldiers that were in the Province of Britain and
Scotland were called back to Rome.24 This allowed various tribes to claim parts of
Scotland as their own. Britons began to settle in south-western Scotland. Sea-rovers, who
were from the north of Ireland, began to settle in Kintyre and the shores of Argyll. In the
year 501, a Scot from Ireland named Fergus brought his soldiers to Scotland and claimed
Dalriada as his own. The Angles settled on the east coast and created the Anglian
Kingdom of Northumbria.25 Thus, due to the departure of Roman soldiers, numerous
kings ruled Scotland, leaving it divided.
Scotland would not be united until about the late seventh century.26 There were
two additional groups in Scotland, the Picts and the Scots.27 Both of these groups
regarded each other as alien. The Picts and the Scots were not only a different race, but

21

Ibid., 3-4.
Ibid., 4-5.
23
Ibid., 4.
24
Ibid., 7.
25
Ibid., 9.
26
Ibid., 15.
27
Ibid.
22

8

they also had a different language and customs. In addition, the Picts themselves were not
unified. There were two Pict kings. One Pict king ruled over Moray in the north while the
other ruled over Fortriu in the south. Due to their differences, the Picts and the Scots
rarely interacted with each other. As a result, the groups became suspicious of each other.
After an intense battle between the Picts and the kings of Dalriada, in which the Picts
won, the Scots started to move closer to the Picts. This caused the Picts to adopt the
language of the Scots, which was Gaelic.28 The Picts and Scots communities would
eventually become united under a Pictish king.29
At the end of the eighth century, a new group of individuals arrived on the shores,
threatening to disrupt the new unity of Scotland.30 The Norsemen, who were from the
west and south-west of Norway, made their way through the Scottish mainland.31 The
Picts attempted to push back the invaders, but an internal rebellion by the Scots, who
were led by Alpin, a descendant of the old King of Dalriada, inhibited their efforts. This
rebellion proved beneficial to the Scots because, with the help of the Norsemen, Alpin’s
son Kenneth would become King of the Scots and Picts in a newly created kingdom
called Alba. However, by the year 872, turmoil in Norway created problems for Kenneth
and his new kingdom.32
Harald Harfagr made himself ruler of Norway. As a result, territory in Scotland
would become home to both chieftains who opposed the rule of Harfagr and chieftains
that were sent by Harfagr to maintain the Norsemen’s hold on Scottish territory. While
28

Ibid., 16.
Ibid., 17; Isabel Henderson, The Picts (London, United Kingdom: Thames and Hudson Limited, 1967),
34.
30
Mackie, A Short History of Scotland, ed. Gordon Donaldson, 17...
31
Ibid., 18; Menzies, Who are the Scots?, 103.
32
Mackie, A Short History of Scotland, ed. Gordon Donaldson, 19.
29

9

Harfagr had many chieftains in Orkney and Shetland, he sent the grandson of one of his
chieftains to the mainland. While on the mainland, the Norsemen assumed control of
Caithness, Sutherland, Ross, and Moray. Kenneth would see some relief from Harfagr’s
advances when the Norsemen started to focus their attention on England.33
The Norsemen, however, would soon learn that they could not defeat the English.
Alfred of England was able to liberate northern England from the control of the
Norsemen in the first half of the tenth century. With this, Alfred decided to further
advance the English line towards Scotland, which created uneasiness for Constantine II,
who became the new King of Alba in the year 900. This advancement pushed the
Norsemen back.34 Constantine II’s kingdom was now neighbouring both the English and
the Norsemen. To ensure peace for his kingdom, Constantine II extended his friendship
to Edward of England. After the death of Danish Earl of Northumbria, the new King of
England, Athelstan, assumed control of Northumbria. As a result, Earl’s two sons fled
and Constantine II befriended them. This angered Athelstan, who then carried out an
attack on Alba. This attacked pushed individuals from Alba, who were now
predominately Scots, into territory held by the Norsemen. In the year 937, the Norsemen,
along with the Scots, advanced towards the northern border of England. However, the
English were able to defeat the Norsemen and the Scots, resulting in Constantine II
promising absolute loyalty to Athelstan. A year or two later, Constantine II would step
down, giving the crown to his kinsman, Malcolm.35

33

Ibid.
Ibid.
35
Ibid., 20.
34
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After coming to the conclusion that he could not hold Northumbria as long as the
Norsemen were in Ireland, Edmund of England gave King Malcolm Northumbria in
exchange for Malcolm’s help in defending the English.36 During this period of time, a
series of disputes over who should become the next King of Alba plagued the kingdom.
After numerous kings were killed, in the year 1005, Malcolm II would become the new
king.37
During his reign, Malcolm II attempted to push the boundaries of his kingdom
into England, but he was ultimately driven back by Utred, who was the son of Earl of
Northumbria. As a reward for his success, King Ethelred of England awarded Utred with
the earldom of the king’s father. Soon after, the Danish invaded England and the Danish
King, Cnut, ordered the murder of Utred. After the death of Utred, the throne of the
earldom was open to Utred’s brother, Eadulf Cudel. Fearing a potential attack from
Malcolm II, Cudel gave him Lothian as a peace offering. However, Cnut opposed this
trade. In the year 1018, Cnut ordered his soldiers to go to battle against Malcolm II’s
men.38 The battle between the two armies was intense, but Malcolm II ended up on top.
This win ensured that Malcolm II would remain in control of Lothian. Following the
death of Malcolm II, his grandson, Duncan, became the King of Alba. However,
Duncan’s reign would be short-lived. In the year 1040, Macbeth, King of Moray, killed
Duncan, taking control of his kingdom, which was now all of Scotland.39 Both of

36

Ibid.
Ibid., 21.
38
Ibid., 22.
39
Ibid.
37
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Duncan’s sons fled after their father’s death.40 Duncan’s eldest son, Malcolm Canmore,
would return from England to Scotland to retake his father’s kingdom.
In the year 1057, Malcolm Canmore killed Macbeth in a fight for the Scottish
Crown near Lumphanan in Aberdeenshire. This victory allowed Canmore to control
Scotland, which was poorer, more divided, and more isolated than its neighbour
England.41 During this time, most people in Scotland lived in small settlements called
clachans or farmtouns. The buildings were mostly composed of turf, stone, skin, or
brushwood, a stark difference to their English neighbours. Despite the poor living
conditions, Canmore was able to organize trade within Scotland and with outside
countries. Organized trade did not exist in Scotland prior to his rule.42 After Canmore’s
rule and until the end of the thirteenth century, Scotland was ruled by a succession of
kings, keeping the country united.43
Most kings that ruled Scotland after Canmore held European values. This was
because most of the kings were Normans. Normans were inheritors of Roman and
European tradition. This resulted in Scotland adopting four essential elements that made
it more European. These four elements were the implementation of feudalism, the
creation of burghs, introducing effective personal control over the machinery of
government, and reforming the church.44 The adoption of these elements resulted in
Scotland becoming a more united country.45 Although Scotland was progressing towards

40

Ibid., 24.
Christopher Smout, A History of the Scottish People: 1560-1830 (New York, New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1969), 19.
42
Ibid., 20.
43
Ibid, 24.
44
Ibid.
45
Ibid., 33.
41
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becoming a unified country, that progress was halted when the English re-entered
Scotland.46
English control of Scotland would lead to the War of Independence. During the
first phase of the war, following the death of Alexander III, Scottish nobles and religious
officials appointed Guardians to rule Scotland in the name of Alexander III’s daughter,
who would become Queen. Meanwhile, King Edward I of England carefully watched the
events in Scotland, waiting for his opportunity to make himself the only ruler of Scotland.
He found it absurd that the island of Britain was divided. He wanted to unite the entire
island under his rule. He decided to achieve this goal through nonviolent means. He
secured the marriage of his son, Edward II, with the young Queen. However, the young
Queen would perish in 1290, putting a halt on Edward I’s plan.47 Though it appeared that
Edward I’s goal of merging the two kingdoms was failing, his fortunes would soon
change.
Infighting among Scots provided another opportunity for Edward I to achieve his
goal. The old Lord of Annandale, Robert de Brus, travelled to Perth with a loyal army.
Despite opposition from the Guardians, de Brus believed that he should be crowned King
of Scotland. Civil war appeared to be inevitable until Edward I offered his services as an
arbiter. As an arbiter, Edward I announced that he would not consider any candidate that
did not acknowledge him as their overlord and would not commit to do homage for him
in Scotland. Out of the thirteen possible candidates, Edward I would choose John De
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Balliol as the new King of Scotland.48 In 1295, Balliol would enter into an alliance with
King Philip of France, infuriating Edward I.49
In the spring of 1296, Edward I crossed the Tweed at Coldstream, appearing
outside of Berwick. The townspeople were stunned and within a few minutes, Edward I
and his soldiers controlled the town. As Edward I stayed behind in Berwick, his
lieutenant, the Earl de Warenne, pushed forward to surround the castle of Dunbar. After a
quick battle with Balliol’s soldiers at the castle, de Warenne and his men took control of
the castle. The news of the attacks at Berwick and Dunbar stuck fear among Scottish
nobles and peoples. A series of attacks by the English led Balliol to plead with Edward I
for peace. Two weeks later, Balliol surrendered his kingdom to Edward I. Edward I left
Scotland in the autumn of 1296, content that he was now in full control of Scotland.
However, little did he know that his campaign of 1296 was far from finished.50
When Edward I left, the Scots started to develop tactical skills from English
officers and garrisons. Wanting to use these newly developed skills against their
occupier, the Scots knew that they first must find a strong leader.51 They found that
leader in William Wallace. Wallace was not a noble or royalty. He was what the Scots
called a country gentleman. Wallace and a large group of Scottish men moved further
into the north of Scotland, capturing castles held by the English. While at the castle of
Dundee, Wallace received word that de Warenne was heading for his location.52 Against
all odds, Wallace and his men were able to defeat the English. This victory made Wallace
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the ruler of Scotland. Wallace used this victory and his new title to invade northern
England. Later that year, Wallace would be given the title of Guardian of Scotland.
However, many nobles and knights in Scotland refused to follow Wallace into battle.
With his army of mostly countrymen, Wallace marched into Falkirk.53 Wallace’s soldiers
were no match for Edward I’s, who quickly defeated the Scots.54 Although Edward I
defeated the Scots and claimed control of Scotland, Scots still opposed English rule.
This opposition to English rule would lead to the second phase of the War of
Independence. During this phase, Robert de Brus, Earl of Carrwick and an English
archbishop, was awarded the Scottish Crown. He won the support of the Scottish Clergy,
who felt that having an English archbishop was important in showing support to the
English Crown. However, de Brus could not get the support of the powerful Lord of
Badenoch, John Comyn. The refusal enraged de Brus, who then killed Comyn.55 After
hearing of this, Edward I ordered his lieutenant, Aymer de Valence, to capture de Brus
and his remaining army. De Brus was able to escape Edward I’s grasp. He left Scotland
in the autumn of 1306.56 Nevertheless, this was not the end of de Brus.
In the spring of 1306, de Brus returned to Scotland. De Brus knew that his small
and under-equipped army would not be able to partake in any battle against the English.57
As de Brus and his soldiers moved through Scotland, they accumulated more men. By the
early summer of 1307, de Brus defeated de Valence at Loudon Hill. After hearing of this
news, the now very sick Edward I and his soldiers marched towards the north in order to
53
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defeat de Brus. During this march, Edward I died. Shortly before his death, he ordered his
successor, Edward II, to continue the march north. Edward II would ignore this request.
By 1308, de Brus was capturing castle after castle from the English.58 In retaliation, the
English descended on Scottish positions.59 De Brus and his soldiers would be able to
defeat the English, capturing all English strongholds in the south of Scotland. These
victories would not be enough for de Brus.60
De Brus wanted Edward II to recognize him as the lawful King of Scotland and
for the English government to recognize Scotland as an independent country. When
Edward II refused, de Brus marched into northern England. In 1318, de Brus captured
Berwick, along with Yorkshire and Mitton. Even with these advancements, the English
government showed no signs of heeding to the demands of de Brus.61 By 1322, Edward II
attempted another invasion of Scotland, but when he and his soldiers noticed that there
were no people within ten miles of Edinburgh, they quickly withdrew. As they retreated,
de Brus followed them. De Brus and his soldiers would successfully defeat the English,
leading to a truce between Scotland and England in 1323.62 Nevertheless, this truce was
short lived.
In 1327, King Edward III renewed the war. After numerous battles, negotiations
on how to end the war started between representatives of Edward III and de Brus. By the
spring of 1328, the two crowns reached an agreement called the Treaty of Northampton.
Not only did this agreement put an end to the war, but it also recognized the
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independence of Scotland and the right for de Brus to be King of the independent
country.63 The process of the formation of a nation, as was just described here for
Scotland, can create conditions that led to the development of nationalism and national
identity.64 The next section of this chapter will discuss the concept of nationalism and
national identity.

Nationalism
Anthony D. Smith defines a nation as a human community that is located in a
supposed homeland, has a distinctive culture, shares common myths and history, and has
common customs and laws for all its members.65 He then defines nationalism as an
ideological movement that attempts to attain and maintain autonomy, unity, and identity
for a population where some of its members believe that they constitute an actual or
potential nation.66 Feelings of nationalism can arise within a nation when its citizens
idealize the state, have a feeling of national superiority, have an uncritical acceptance of
the nation-state and its political institutions, suppress ambivalent feelings towards the
nation-state, overemphasis national association in the self-concept of individuals in the
nation-state, and use derogating comparisons with individuals that are not considered to
be part of the nation-state.67 There are two types of nationalism.68 The first type of
nationalism is called civic nationalism. This type of nationalism involves bringing
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together and integrating distinct ethnic populations to create a new ‘territorial nation.’
Scottish nationalism is an example of civic nationalism because one does not need to be
born in Scotland to be considered Scottish.69 The second type of nationalism is ethnic
nationalism.70 In a post-independent sense, ethnic nations are comprised of ‘kinsmen.’71
In other words, individuals in countries with ethnic nationalism share the same “blood
and soil.”72
In addition to these two types of nationalisms, some European states have
experienced a surge in regional nationalism.73 Regional nationalism, or regionalism, has
many different meanings. Individuals in a region of a state can exhibit regionalism when
they feel threatened by the nation-state, feel excluded from the rest of the population, or
disagree with how the state controls their territory. In other cases, regionalism occurs
when individuals aspire to restore past ethnic and cultural identities and autonomies.74
Michael Keating states that “regionalisms of developed western societies represent
attempts to come to terms with the changing constellation of power and to reconstitute
politics on a territorial basis which is legitimized historically but which can be used to
confront contemporary political and economic realities.”75 There are two types of
regionalism. The first is called institutional regionalism. Institutional regionalism began
in the 1960s in many European states. In these states, the government would adopt a
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regional development policy that would facilitate development in peripheral regions to
stimulate economic development for the entire state. However, these policies did not
produce the desired outcome.76
Over time, these development policies became politicized and conflict would
arise between the central government and the regional government. In some states, these
development policies created powerful regional governments that became more assertive
and increased their demands for financial support from the central government. In
addition, some regional governments increased calls for more territorial autonomy from
the central government. This led to the emergence of regionalism within some
territories.77 The second type of regionalism, which is the most common, is called
autonomist regionalism. Autonomist regionalism deals with ethnicity, culture, and
identity. Specifically, autonomist regionalism is applied to “state-less nations” where
separatist or secessionist movements are occurring.78 Although the two types of
regionalism have different definitions, both arise because of similar factors. Firstly,
regionalism arises because of the lack of support for the centralist model of government
in some regions. Secondly, regionalism arises when individuals within these regions see
their territory as distinctively different from the rest of the nation-state. And thirdly,
regionalism arises because many individuals in these regions see themselves as having a
different national identity than the rest of the individuals in the nation-state.79
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National identity is a more general concept that is related to nationalism and
regionalism.80 It tends to explain the emotional bond individuals have with their nationstate.81 In particular, national identity arises when individuals form a positive bond with
their nation-state.82 There are six concepts related to national identity. They include an
understanding of which nation-state an individual belongs or potentially wants to belong
to, a positive feeling towards the nation-state an individual belongs to, the eagerness to
incorporate the state’s culture, forming illusory beliefs about the aims and problems of
the state, forming illusory beliefs about the current opportunities and constraints of
individuals in the state, and elevating the significance of national affiliation in one’s
identity.83 National identity can also exist in regions of a nation-state.
In stateless nations, individuals can possess a national identity that reflects their
loyalty to the region.84 For example, although Scotland is part of the United Kingdom,
some individuals in Scotland see themselves as being just Scottish. However, some in
Scotland see themselves as being both Scottish and British because dual national
identities can arise in regions within nation-states.85 According to some scholars, some
forms of Scottish identity have existed since the Roman times. This, along with its
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historical relationship with England, has led to the development of Scottish nationalism,86
which has increased over the years.

Scottish Nationalism and Devolution
The growth of nationalism in Scotland after the Act of Union in 1707 can be
divided into three phases. The first phase stretched from 1707 to the 1740s. This phase
was characterized by discontent among the Scottish population.87 The formation of the
Union between Scotland and England led to hardships in many industrial sectors in
Scotland.88 For example, the English government increased the salt tax in Scotland,
which had negative repercussions for the herring industry. The woollen industry also
suffered because of increased competition from England.89 Another issue that caused
discontent in Scotland was the extension of the English system for the collection of
customs and excise into Scottish territory.90
The second phase stretched from 1750 to 1850. During this phase, expression of
discontent towards the Union reached low levels. Scotland was witnessing the revival of
Scottish literature, and many individuals in Scotland started to take an interest in English
culture and history. People also witnessed a resurgence in the economy with the Scottish
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economy expanding in all sectors.91 This century of harmony, however, ended with the
renewal of criticism by individuals in Scotland towards the Union.92
In the third phase, many started to take an interest in how Scotland was run. The
Manager of Scotland disappeared, which created concerns that Westminster was gaining
more control over Scottish issues.93 By 1853, the National Association for the
Vindication of Scottish Rights was formed. Resolutions within this association asked for
the appointment of a Secretary of State for Scotland and increased Scottish representation
at Westminster. Although the resolutions were not taken seriously by the British
Government and the association was dissolved in 1856,94 the association’s proposal for a
separate administration in Scotland was kept alive. In 1881, demands for a Scottish
Secretary became more prominent. Administrative change would soon come to Scotland.
Devolution in the United Kingdom is the transfer of power from the central
government in London to regional governments in Wales, Scotland, and Northern
Ireland.95 Devolution has been the greatest constitutional change in the United Kingdom
since the Great Reform Act of 1832.96 Prior to devolution, Scotland was often referred to
as North Britain and under the control of the British Home Secretary.97 In the 1880s, Irish
Home Rule created a desire within Scotland for greater independence from Westminster.
Lord Rosebery advocated on behalf of Scotland. He argued for the creation of a separate
minister for Scotland. In 1885, as a result of his efforts, the central government in London
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began devolving power to Scotland.98 This devolution resulted in the creation of the
Scottish Office.99 In a conversation between Lord Salisbury and the Duke of Richmond
and Gordon, Lord Salisbury stated that the purpose of this newly created office was to
address the concerns of the Scottish people that Scotland did not have enough control
over its own territory.100 At its inception, the Scottish Office had very few functional
responsibilities.
In 1954, the Royal Commission on Scottish Affairs, the Balfour Commission,
established two criteria to assess the effectiveness of the Scottish Office in regards to
Scottish affairs. The first criterion stated that the government in Scotland needed to be
designed in such a way that it promoted Scottish businesses in Scotland. The second
criterion stated that Scottish needs and points of view must be taken into consideration
when formulating policy for Scotland.101 By the 1960s, the Scottish Office started to gain
more power. In the 1960s, the Secretary of State was responsible for bringing all issues
relating to Scotland before Cabinet. The Secretary of State was also responsible for the
administration of six departments within the Scottish Office. Those departments included
the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Environment and Fisheries, the
Department of Development, the Department of Education and Industry, the Department
of Health, and the Home Department.102 The Scottish Office also witnessed an increase in
its ministerial team throughout the twentieth century. In 1979, a new Under- Secretary of

98

Ibid., 111.
Ibid.
100
Ibid.
101
Ibid., 112.
102
Ibid., 111.
99

23

State joined the Secretary of State.103 By 1998, the Scottish Office possessed a Secretary
of State, five Under-Secretaries of State, and a Minister of State.104
Although it appeared that the Secretary of State and the Scottish Office were
given more autonomy, that autonomy was limited.105 The effectiveness of the Secretary
of State was constrained by the conflict between their role as Scotland’s Minister and the
convention of collective Cabinet responsibility.106 This convention made it difficult for
the Secretary of State to create new policies that may be embraced in Scotland, but not
favoured in England. English ministers had the ability to strike down policies initiated by
the Secretary of State. As a result, the Secretary of State’s autonomy was limited to
matters in Scotland that English ministers did not care about.107
Another issue with the Secretary of State was that it was an appointed position.
Instead of the citizens of Scotland choosing their representative at Westminster, the
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom decided who would be tasked with looking after
Scottish affairs. This meant that the Secretary of State often came from a political party
that had not won in Scotland. Also, this position was also seen as a junior post within
Cabinet. However, even with its limitations and faults, the Secretary of State was viewed
by many in Scotland as a key political figure. Willie Ross, Secretary of State in 1964 to
1970 and 1974 to 1976, referred to the public’s expectations of the position as
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“approaching the archangelic in Scotland.”108 These issues would remain until the
election of Tony Blair and the “New” Labour government.109
After the death of popular Labour Party leader John Smith in 1994, four Labour
Members of Parliament sought the leadership of the Labour Party. Those individuals
were Gordon Brown, Tony Blair, John Prescott, and Margaret Beckett.110 As the
leadership race progressed, The Scotsman, a Scottish news agency, published a survey
showing that Brown was the most popular candidate in the leadership race in Scotland,
followed by Blair.111 Despite his popularity, Brown withdrew his name from contention
and decided to back Blair for the leadership.112 This move somehow proved beneficial to
the Labour Party during the European elections a few days later. In Scotland, the Labour
Party achieved forty-three percent of the vote, defeating both the Conservative Party and
the Scottish National Party. This was the Labour Party’s best ever performance in a
European election.113
On July 21st, 1994, Blair defeated both Prescott and Beckett to become the leader
of the Labour Party. In October of 1994, Blair unveiled the party’s bold new election
strategy, called “New Labour, New Britain.”114 This was considered to be the Labour
Party’s most radical electoral strategy.115 Part of this plan was the proposal for further
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devolution to Scotland, which became part of the Labour Party’s 1997 manifesto.116
Addressing the issue of devolution guided the Labour Party to one of their best electoral
performances in Scotland. During the 1997 general election, the Labour Party achieved
about forty-five percent of the vote, making them the best performing party in
Scotland.117
It is important to note that Blair and “New Labour” cannot solely be credited with
the reinvigoration of the devolution debate. In 1993, the Labour Party and the Liberal
Democrats created the Scottish Constitutional Commission.118 In this commission, the
parties negotiated issues regarding a new Scottish Parliament, including the future
electoral system and gender balance. Debating intensified between the two parties over
the format of the future parliament. The Labour Party argued for a parliament with 112
members while the Liberal Democrats wanted a parliament with 145 members. A
compromise of 129 members was reached.119 On November 30th, 1995, the Commission
released a document with a set of proposals for a new Scottish Parliament. These
proposals included a proportional representation electoral system, economic powers, taxraising powers, and competence over large parts of public life in Scotland.120 Thus,
although the conception of a Scottish Parliament was a combination of the efforts of both
the Labour Party and Liberal Democrats, it was Blair and the Labour Party that benefited
from this proposal, allowing them to defeat the Conservative Party and Scottish National
Party in Scotland.
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While the Labour Party benefited electorally from their policy on devolution, the
Conservative Party’s policy on this issue may have led to their downfall in the 1997
general election, particularly in Scotland. John Major and the Conservative Party were
firmly opposed to a Scottish Parliament, believing that it would lead to the break up of
the United Kingdom.121 Many believed that the 1997 Conservative Party manifesto also
echoed anti-devolution sentiments.122 Although the Conservative Party voiced their
opposition, Blair and the “New” Labour Party kept their commitment to further devolve
power to Scotland after the 1997 general election.
To confirm the popularity of further devolving power to Scotland, the newly
elected Blair and the Labour Party held a devolution referendum in Scotland five months
after forming government. Individuals were asked two questions: should there be a
Scottish Parliament and should that Parliament have tax-varying powers. The majority of
individuals who participated in the referendum voted yes to both questions123 with a voter
turnout of about sixty percent.124 With these results, Blair knew that he would have to
move forward with further devolving power to Scotland.
Devolution and the creation of the Scottish Parliament came in the form of the
Scotland Bill that was introduced by the Blair government in 1997.125 Following its
passage in 1998, the Scotland Bill became the Scotland Act of 1998.126 The Act provided
for the establishment of the Scottish Parliament at Holyrood and the ability of that
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Parliament to create laws within its own areas of competence.127 The Act also transferred
some constituency responsibilities from Members of Parliament representing Scottish
constituencies to Members of the Scottish Parliament. The Act also created a
constitutional court, called the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, with the power
to only rule on Scottish legislation.128 The Scotland Act of 1998 also provided powers to
the Scottish Parliament itself. The Scottish Parliament would be tasked with policies over
agriculture, fisheries, economic development, education, environment, local government,
health, social work, civil law, criminal justice, tourism, and arts.129 The Act, however,
preserved Westminster’s supremacy. It allows the central government to legislate on
matters that have been devolved to Scotland. This is because the Act does not intend to
affect the unity of the United Kingdom.130 All in all, although the Act devolved power to
the new Scottish Parliament, Westminster still has power over Scotland.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

Regional nationalism in many European states has been on the rise. Regional
nationalism can exist in regions of nation-states. Within these regions, individuals can
develop a national identity that is different than that of the rest of the individuals in the
nation-state.131 In these regions, individuals can acquire either a dual national identity or
an exclusive national identity. Some have suggested that devolution and dual national
identity are correlated.132 The theory of new institutionalism may help explain this trend.
New institutionalism studies how political institutions affect society. Both the
Conservative Party and Labour Party of the United Kingdom indirectly use this theory to
make the argument that devolved institutions affect Scottish society. Some of these
nation-states where both dual and exclusive national identity exist include Catalonia in
Spain, Flanders in Belgium, and Scotland in the United Kingdom.133 The implementation
of devolution is important because individuals who attribute themselves with a dual
national identity are less likely to support independence than are their exclusive national
identity counterparts.134 This chapter reviews the literature that explores seven key
subjects. Those subjects include nationalism in Europe, the relationship between
devolution and dual national identity, the theory of institutionalism and new
institutionalism, dual national identity in Spain and Belgium, dual national identity in
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pre-devolved Scotland, the relationship between national identity and calls for the
independence, and the relationship between national identity and support for the Scottish
National Party.

Nationalism in Europe
Brigid Laffan states that nationalism is a product of the French Revolution and
popular sovereignty and that throughout history, nationalism was required for a state to
be considered legitimate.135 Laffan claims that during the 1960s, many Western European
countries started to experience an increase in regional national identity within the nationstate.136 This increase led to the creation of regional nationalist movements, which forced
many central governments to reconstruct the balance between the central government and
regional bodies.137
Like Laffan, Anthony Smith also studied regional national identity in Western
Europe. He found that it has been on the rise since 1945.138 He states that there are three
factors that can explain this increase. First, nation-states have become more powerful.
This power translates into an increased ability to interfere in every sphere of social life.
This increased interference led to resentment among some minority groups within the
state. Second, globalization and technology resulted in the spread of literacy to remote
areas within Western European states. This increased the level of consciousness and
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expectations among minority groups. And third, many Western European states
implemented education policies that promote a single civic culture. This created divisions
along pre-existing ethnic lines within the state. These three factors tended to revitalize the
memories of these minority cultures, which has led to an increase in regional national
identity.139
Similar to the above two scholars, Michael Keating also studied regional national
identity in Europe, finding that it has been on the rise.140 Keating provides an economic
explanation for this increase. The economic demands of regions are changing. Before,
regional governments were able to press the central government for resources in the form
of transfers or diverted public or private investment. This, along with tariff protection,
created a disincentive for independence. Now, the capacity of the central government to
provide these resources has been reduced by the negotiations of policies such as free
trade agreements. Regional governments now put more emphasize on learning how to
influence aspects of the international market, thereby relying less heavily on the central
government.141
In addition, Benedict Anderson also studied regional national identity. Similar to
the above studies, he also found that in many European countries, regional national
identity was on the rise.142 In Western Europe, regional nationalist movements exist
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because of deep historical memories and traditional communities.143 Anderson also
claims that political oppression against minority groups in Western Europe is another
reason for the increase in regional national identity.144 In addition, Anderson states that
the rise of mass communication is associated with the rise of regional national identity in
Western Europe.145
Mass communication began in the nineteenth century with the introduction of
mass-oriented newspapers. These newspapers were not only read by the middle class, but
by the growing working class, thus increasing literacy among all classes. Acknowledging
the importance of literacy, governments started to implement modern school systems,
with standardized textbooks, standardized curricula, and standardized examinations. This
new school system promoted the dominant political vernacular, which led in an increase
in regional nationalism within regions in nation-states.146
The common theme among most of the literature is that regional national identity
is on the rise in Europe. Laffan claimed that this rise in regional national identity in
Western Europe forced many central governments to reconfigure their governing styles.
Smith stated that the rise in regional national identity was caused by the marginalization
of minority groups by central governments and the spread of literacy. Keating stated that
the rise in regional identity in Europe was related to economic demands. Anderson
claimed that the rise in regional national identity in Europe was the result of increased
literacy and mass communication, which was similar to the explanation that Smith
provided. All in all, the literature above indicates that regional national identity in Europe
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is on the rise and that there are numerous reasons for their increase. To respond to this
increase, some central governments have implemented devolution.147

Devolution and Dual National Identity
In this section, literature that evaluated the correlation between devolution and
dual national identity will be examined. According to a study conducted by Frank
Bechhofer and David McCrone, in both Scotland and Wales, over half of individuals
studied attributed their dual national identity with the fact that both countries have
devolved regional governments.148 Unfortunately, no further explanation is given for this
increase in dual national identity. The story is much different in England. After the
announcement of devolution to both Scotland and Wales in 1997, the number of
individuals in England who claimed to be exclusively English rose and the number of
individuals claiming to be British and English or exclusively British dropped. The reason
for this increase in exclusive national identity in England was largely due to the fact that
the English were witnessing the creation of devolved governments in both Scotland and
Wales but saw no devolved institutions heading their way.149 Another indication that
devolution in the United Kingdom is leading to an increase in exclusive identity in
England is the fact that numerous English national political parties that focus solely on
English issues have formed in the post-devolution period. Some of these parties include
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the English Independence Party, the England First Party, and the English Democrat
Party.150 These three parties seek to create an English parliament that would promote
English issues. Unlike the England First Party and the English Democrat Party, the
English Independence Party does not seek to breakup the United Kingdom. However,
they would not be opposed to the breakup if it was to occur.151 It should be noted,
however, that some scholars argue that Englishness and Britishness are intertwined,
making the distinction between these two identities difficult.152 The next section will
discuss the theory that may explain why devolution influences national identity.

Institutionalism
The origins of the institutional approach can be traced back to the beginning of
political science.153 The institutional approach can be seen in the historical works of
various political philosophers.154 For example, Plato’s famous work, Republic, was a
comparison between different forms of government.155 However, the institutional
approach was largely insignificant until the rise of political science as an academic
discipline in the nineteenth century.156 Scholars of political science were increasingly
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employing the institutional approach in their research.157 The importance of the
institutional approach during this time was illustrated through the creation of the Weimer
Republic in Germany.158 The institutional approach is also known as old institutionalism.
Old institutionalism is a holistic approach that is concerned with three elements.159 These
elements include the practical function of an institution, legally binding formal rules, and
the comparison between governmental systems.160 Old institutionalism started to decrease
in significance, however, around the 1950s, when other scholars from different
theoretical traditions started to challenge this approach.161
In 1984, two political scientists, James March and Johan Olsen, argued that
political institutions were too important to ignore because they have such a large
influence on everyday life.162 They argued that because of their importance, political
institutions must return to the forefront of political science research.163 To address this,
they devised a new institutional approach to study political institutions, which they called
new institutionalism.164 New institutionalism looks at how political institutions affect the
behaviour of individual actors and society as a whole.165 It also looks at how individuals
can affect political institutions.166 These two institutional approaches differ in four ways.
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Firstly, both institutional approaches define and study institutions differently. Old
institutionalists define political institutions as static.167 This means that when studying
institutions, old institutionalists look at whole systems of government because they
believe that political institutions never change.168 New institutionalists, however, define
political institutions as dynamic.169 Due to the dynamic nature of political institutions,
new institutionalists study different aspects that may affect institutions, such as cabinet
decision-making, inter-governmental relationships, the electoral system, and tax and
benefit systems.170
Secondly, while old institutionalists are interested in formal rules, new
institutionalists are interested in informal rules.171 Formal rules are rules that are clear,
enforceable, and specified.172 Informal rules are rules that are unwritten and
unenforceable, but are important to the function of a governmental system.173 An
example comes from the United Kingdom. After an election, it is the unwritten
responsibility of the monarch to appoint a Prime Minister that they feel has the support of
the House of Commons.174 Therefore, although both institutional approaches study
institutions, their approach to that study is different.
Thirdly, old institutionalism and new institutionalism use different scientific
approaches to conducting research. Old institutionalists use an inductive approach when
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performing research.175 This means that they first collect data, and then use that data to
arrive at a theory.176 New institutionalist, however, use a deductive approach when
conducting research.177 This means that they chose a theory and then test that theory
using evidence they collected.178
And lastly, unlike old institutionalism, new institutionalism can be used by
numerous disciplines, creating different sub-categories. According to Vivien Lowndes,
some of those sub-categories include international institutionalism, normative
institutionalism, empirical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, historical
institutionalism, and feminist institutionalism.179 In sum, unlike old institutionalism,
which is a holistic approach,180 new institutionalism can be utilized by a variety of
disciplines.
As was mentioned previously, the theory of new institutionalism claims that
institutions can affect society. Political parties in the United Kingdom have indirectly
used this theory to make the argument that devolved institutions can affect Scottish
society. Both the Conservative Party and Labour Party have opposing views towards the
effects of devolved institutions on Scottish society. The Conservative Party has been
historically opposed to a Scottish Parliament. They believe that it would lead to the break
up of the United Kingdom because the growth of the Scottish Government may increase
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the desire for independence.181 This sentiment did not change under Margaret Thatcher or
John Major. Both of these individuals were confirmed unionists, so during their
leadership, any proposals related to devolution were quickly quashed.182 Individuals
associated with the Conservative Party in Scotland also displayed anti-devolution
sentiment. Some of those individuals included Brian Montieth, leader of the “Think
Twice” campaign, and Donald Findlay, leader of the “No-No” campaign.183 Unlike the
Conservatives, the Labour Party was in favour of devolution to Scotland.
The Scottish National Party experienced its first parliamentary breakthrough with
Winifred Ewing’s Hamilton by-election victory in 1967. To respond to what was viewed
as a growing nationalist movement in Scotland, the Labour Government of Harold
Wilson created the Royal Commission on the Constitution in 1969. The commission’s
report, which was not released until October of 1973, supported further devolution to
Scotland. In 1978, the Labour Government would pass the Scotland Act of 1978. As with
any act, this Act had a number of amendments. One of the amendments to the Act, called
the Cunningham Amendment, stated that “if less than 40 percent of those entitled to vote
were to vote yes, then orders for the repeal of the legislation would have to be laid before
parliament.” When it came time to vote on the proposals laid out by the Scotland Act, 33
percent of people in Scotland voted yes, while 31 percent voted no. However, 36 percent
of registered voters did not vote, so the condition set by the Cunningham Amendment
was not met. As a result, the Scottish National Party withdrew their support for the
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Labour Government, causing a vote of confidence. The Labour Government would lose
that vote, causing a change in government.184
Throughout the 1980s, while in opposition, the Labour Party continued to develop
policies on devolution. During this period, John Smith, a Scottish Member of Parliament
who would become leader of the Labour Party, described the creation of a new Scottish
Parliament as “unfinished business.” He committed the party firmly to devolution.185 In
1993, along with the Liberal-Democrats, the Labour Party created the Scottish
Constitutional Commission.186 Aside from discussing how a new Scottish Parliament
would function, the commission also discussed Scotland’s position in the Union.187
Following the death of Smith in 1994, Tony Blair became the new leader of the Labour
Party. Blair adopted all Labour Party policies related to devolution from his
predecessors.188 Therefore, to respond to the growing nationalist movement, the Labour
Party proposed and has been in favour of devolving power to Scotland. This followed a
pattern that was evident in other European countries, particularly Spain and Belgium.

Dual National Identity in Spain and Belgium
Some countries in Europe have experienced a rise in dual national identity. One of
these countries is the Kingdom of Spain. Individuals in the regional community of
Catalonia experience self-identification, which can lead to them associating themselves
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with either a regional national identity or a dual national identity.189 After the death of
Francisco Franco in 1975, which also ended the forty years of dictatorship, the Spanish
government began to devolve power to regional communities. This was an attempt to
curtail growing nationalist movements, particularly in Catalonia. The policy of
devolution became official after the introduction of the new Spanish Constitution in
1978.190 To determine if devolution resulted in a decrease in regional nationalism and an
increase in dual nationalism, Luis Moreno and Ana Arriba looked at nationalism in
Catalonia.
Moreno and Arriba examined nationalism in Catalonia in 1986, 1991, and
1994.191 They found that in all of the three years studied, there were more individuals that
attributed themselves with a dual national identity than there were individuals that
attributed themselves with an exclusive Catalan identity.192 Two years later, Moreno and
Arriba, along with Araceli Serrano, wanted to determine if dual national identity in
Catalonia was still higher than exclusive Catalan identity. Using data from 1990 to 1995,
the researchers found that there were more individuals attributing themselves with a dual
national identity than there were individuals attributing themselves as being exclusively
Catalan.193 Thus, Moreno, Arriba, and Serrano showed that dual national identity in
Catalonia was higher than exclusive Catalan identity in the post-devolution period. Other
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studies also concluded that dual national identity in Catalonia was higher than exclusive
Catalan identity in the post-devolution period.194 However, unlike the previous literature
discussed, Montserrat Guibernau makes it clear that devolution is the reason for the
higher percentage of individuals attributing themselves with a dual national identity in
Catalonia.195
Ivan Serrano and Montserrat Guibernau also reviewed nationalism in Catalonia
following the creation of the 1978 Spanish Constitution. Serrano and Guibernau found
that during the post-devolution period, the percentage of individuals attributing
themselves with a dual national identity was higher than those attributing themselves with
exclusive Catalan identity.196 However, Serrano found that since 1979, the percentage of
both individuals attributing themselves with exclusive Catalan identity and individuals
that attribute themselves with being “[m]ore Catalan than Spanish” had been
increasing.197 Serrano states that devolution may be playing a role in this increase.198 The
Kingdom of Belgium is another European state that gains the attention of researchers
studying dual national identity.
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In Belgium, the central government introduced devolution in 1970 in an attempt
to hold the multinational state together.199 After obtaining independence from the
Southern Netherlands in 1830, the political elites in Belgium ruled the newly formed
country as a francophone nation.200 This created animosity towards the elites by the two
other language groups present in the country.201 Although the German population was not
pleased, the Dutch speakers, or the Flemish, were particularly hostile towards the
francophone rulers. This led to many individuals in Flanders attributing themselves with
being exclusively Flemish. These same individuals were also calling for an independent
Flanders.202 To determine if devolution had an impact on Flemish nationalism, Jaak
Billiet, Bart Maddens, and André-Paul Frognier evaluated national identity in Flanders in
the post-devolution period.
They found that in 2003, the percentage of individuals attributing themselves with
a dual national identity was higher than the percentage of individuals attributing
themselves with exclusive Flemish identity.203 In fact, many individuals in Flanders did
not consider Flemish and Belgian national identities as conflicting, but rather, many saw
them as complementary. This may be why the percentage of individuals attributing
themselves with a dual national identity has been increasing since 1986.204 Thus, Billiet
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et al. found that more individuals in Flanders claimed to have a dual national identity than
claimed to be just Flemish. The reviewed literature shows that dual national identity in
Catalonia and Flanders is higher than exclusive national identity in their respective postdevolution periods. However, there is a limited amount of literature on national identity
in these regions in their pre-devolution periods, particularly about Flanders. The next
section will review literature focusing on dual national identity in Scotland.

Dual National Identity in Scotland During the Pre-1999 Devolution Period
Numerous scholars have examined dual national identity in Scotland prior to
devolution in 1999. In fact, some literature goes as far back as the 1980s. In 1986, it was
found that more individuals in Scotland claimed to have a dual national identity than
claimed an exclusive Scottish identity.205 In 1992, it was also found that dual national
identity in Scotland was higher than exclusive Scottish identity.206
This trend of higher dual national identity compared to exclusive Scottish identity
continued into 1994.207 In 1997, Anthony Heath and James Kellas found, using British
and Scottish Election Survey data, that dual national identity was much higher than
exclusive Scottish identity.208 When comparing the first three years discussed, one could
conclude that dual national identity in Scotland increased at the expense of exclusive
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Scottish identity. When adding the fourth year discussed to the comparison, dual national
identity was still higher than exclusive Scottish identity, but exclusive Scottish identity
increased.209
Some of the literature looks at national identity in Scotland over a period of time.
Using data from the Scottish Election Study, the British and Scottish Election Studies,
and British and Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys, John Curtice discovered that dual
national identity in Scotland was higher than exclusive Scottish from 1992 to the year of
devolution.210 During that same period, Alison Park, John Curtice, Katarina Thomson,
Lindsey Jarvis, and Catherine Bromley also found, using data from British and Scottish
Election Surveys, that dual national identity was higher than exclusive Scottish identity.
However, over that period of time, dual national identity was declining and exclusive
Scottish identity was increasing. This was mostly at the expense of individuals attributing
themselves with being more Scottish than British and equally Scottish and British.211
Park et al. were not the only scholars to discover this trend. From 1992 to 1997, Ross
Bond and Michael Rosie also found, using survey data from Systems Three Scotland and
ICM Research Limited, that although dual national identity remained higher than
exclusive Scottish identity, it was on the decline while exclusive Scottish identity was on
the rise. This increase in exclusive Scottish identity was at the expense of individuals
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attributing themselves with being more Scottish than British and equally Scottish and
British, which was consistent with Park’s et al. study.212
Unlike Park et al. and Bond and Rosie, David McCrone does not find a consistent
pattern of increase and decrease between dual national identity and exclusive Scottish
identity. Using data from The Scotsman, Scottish Election Surveys, the Scottish
Referendum Study, and Scottish Parliamentary Election Studies, McCrone found that, in
1986, there were more individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity
as opposed to an exclusive Scottish identity. In 1991, although the number of individuals
attributing themselves with a dual national identity was higher than those attributing
themselves with an exclusive Scottish identity, the number of those with an exclusive
Scottish identity increased at the expense of individuals claiming to be “More Scottish
than British” and “More British than Scottish.” It is important to note that the overall
number of individuals attributing themselves with a dual national identity was no
different in 1991 than in 1986. In 1992, the number of individuals attributing themselves
with a dual national identity rose at the expense of exclusive Scottish identity. In
particular, the number of individuals attributing themselves with the identity of being
“More Scottish than British” and “Equally Scottish and British” rose.213
In 1997, although the number of individuals attributing themselves with a dual
national identity was higher than exclusive Scottish identity, their numbers dropped
because of the fall in the number of people attributing themselves with being more
Scottish than British and equally Scottish and British. Exclusive Scottish identity rose
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during that same year. The last year that was under review, 1999, witnessed a similar loss
in the number of people attributing themselves with being more Scottish than British and
equally Scottish and British. However, dual national identity in Scotland was still higher
than exclusive Scottish identity.214 Although John Curtice reached a similar conclusion
about national identity in Scotland in 1997 and 1999, he found that the number of
individuals that attributed themselves with being exclusively Scottish remained the same.
The only changes that he noted was that the number of individuals attributing themselves
with being more Scottish than British increased while the number of individuals that
attributed themselves with being “Equally Scottish and British” decreased.215
Similar to McCrone, Ailsa Henderson, using British Election Survey data, also
does not find a consistent pattern of increase and decrease between dual national identity
and exclusive Scottish identity. From 1986 to 1991, there were more individuals that
attributed themselves with being exclusively Scottish than there were individuals
attributing themselves with a dual national identity. From 1991 to 1992, the number of
individuals attributing themselves with a dual national identity increased at the expense
of exclusive Scottish identity. Specifically, the number of individuals attributing
themselves with being more Scottish than British increased. It stayed that way until 1998,
when the number of individuals attributing themselves with being exclusively Scottish
increased and the number of individuals attributing themselves with a dual national
identity decreased. In particular, exclusively Scottish identity increased at the expense of
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more Scottish than British and equally Scottish and British identity.216 The above
literature shows that, in the pre-devolution period, dual national identity in Scotland was
higher than exclusively Scottish identity even though some scholars have found that dual
national identity was decreasing and exclusively Scottish identity was increasing.

Dual National Identity and Calls for Independence
As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, the Conservative Party of the
United Kingdom believed that devolution to Scotland would result in increased calls for
independence and thus, lead to the breakup of the United Kingdom.217 However, as was
also mentioned previously, devolution to Scotland has led to an increase in individuals
attributing themselves with a dual national identity. This is important because numerous
studies have indicated that individuals with exclusive Scottish identity are more likely to
support Scottish independence than are individuals who attribute themselves with a dual
national identity. Some of this literature focused on the pre-devolution period in Scotland.
In 1997, individuals in Scotland with exclusive Scottish identity were more likely to
support Scottish independence than were their dual national identity counterparts.218
Another study that reviewed the relationship between national identity in Scotland and
the desire for independence during that same year came to a different conclusion. David
McCrone found that in 1997, the difference in preference for independence between
individuals with exclusive Scottish identity and individuals with dual national identity
216
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was so minor that one could not conclude that individuals with exclusive Scottish identity
were more likely to support independence than were their dual national identity
counterparts.219 This, however, did not prevent others from studying this correlation.
Accordingly, in the post-1999 devolution period, some scholars have reviewed the
relationship between national identity in Scotland and calls for independence. From 1999
to 2001 and 2005, individuals that claimed to be exclusively Scottish were more likely to
support Scottish independence compared to their dual national identity counterparts.220
Like most academic fields, other scholars have disputed the link between national
identity and calls for independence in the post-devolution period. In 2003 and 2005, some
literature claimed that the correlation between national identity and calls for
independence in Scotland was not strong enough to conclude that national identity and
support for independence were related.221
However, other literature disputes this claim. In 2003, Ross Bond and Michael
Rosie found that there was strong enough statistical significance to conclude that
individuals that attributed themselves with an exclusively Scottish identity were more
likely than individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity to support
the independence of Scotland from the United Kingdom.222 Therefore, most of the above
literature demonstrates that one could conclude that an individual’s national identity does
determine their opinion on the separation of Scotland from the United Kingdom, which is
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important for this thesis. However, there are some studies that find that the statistical data
is not strong enough to claim that a correlation exists between national identity and desire
for independence. The next section will evaluate literature that establishes a correlation
between an individual’s national identity and whether or not they support the Scottish
National Party.

National Identity and the Scottish National Party
The Scottish National Party was created through a merger between the National
Party of Scotland and the Scottish Party in 1934. The political goal of the Scottish Party,
despite its name, was to strengthen the British Empire. The Scottish National Party
remained largely irreverent until they won a by-election in Motherwell and Wishaw in
1945.223 The Scottish National Party’s next electoral breakthrough came in 1967, when
the party won another parliamentary seat in the Hamilton by-election.224 In 1974, the
party won eleven seats in the House of Commons.225 After devolution, the Scottish
National Party did not immediately gain power in the newly devolved Scottish Parliament
at Holyrood. From 1999 to 2007, the Labour-led coalition with the Liberal Democrats
dominated politics in Scotland.226 It was not until 2007 that the Scottish National Party
formed government in Scotland.227 Although it was only a minority government, it was
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the Scottish National Party’s first major victory.228 They secured forty-seven out of a
potential one hundred and twenty nine seats at Holyrood.229 In 2011, the Scottish
National Party won sixty-nine seats in the Scottish Parliament, forming a majority
government.230 The victory of the Scottish National Party had less to do with
independence and more to do with the fact that many saw them as a party that was both
more competent than both the other parties and willing to stand up for Scotland when it
came to disputes with the central government in London.231 Although independence was
an indirect reason for the success of the Scottish National Party, many scholars have
evaluated the link between national identity and an individual’s likelihood that they will
support the Scottish National Party. Mainly, some believe that individuals who are
exclusively Scottish are more likely to vote for the Scottish National Party than are those
who attribute themselves with a dual national identity.232
Most scholars look at this correlation after 1999. According to the studies by
Frank Bechhofer and David McCrone and Michael Rosie and Ross Bond, individuals
who attribute themselves with being exclusively Scottish were more likely than their dual
national identity counterparts to vote for the Scottish National Party.233 Ross Bond and
Michael Rosie confirmed this. From 1999 to 2001, support for the Scottish National Party
was higher among exclusively Scottish individuals than dual national identity
228
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individuals.234 However, Bond and Rosie only compared exclusive Scottish identity
individuals with individuals that attribute themselves with being more Scottish than
British. This neglects the opinions of individuals that attribute themselves with being
equally Scottish and British and more British than Scottish. Therefore, although their
study is informative, it lacks a full comparison between exclusive Scottish individuals
and dual national identity individuals and their support for the Scottish National Party.
Frank Bechhofer and David McCrone addressed this issue. In their study, they compared
exclusively Scottish individuals with all forms of dual national identity in Scotland. They
found that individuals that attribute themselves with exclusive Scottish identity were
more likely to support the Scottish National Party compared to individuals that attribute
themselves with a dual national identity.235 Although there is not much research on this
subject, the literature above demonstrates that there is a correlation between national
identity and support for the Scottish National Party in Scotland. Using the literature in the
previous section and this section, it could be concluded that exclusively Scottish
individuals are more likely to support independence and the Scottish National Party than
are dual national identity individuals.

Conclusion
In conclusion, a common theme in the literature is that regional national identity
is on the rise in Europe. This rise, caused by numerous factors, has resulted in many
nation-states rebalancing power between the central government and the regions. Some
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scholars believe that the process of devolution will lead to individuals attributing
themselves with a dual national identity within these regions. The theory of
institutionalism, particularly new institutionalism, can help explain how devolved
institutions are influencing national identity within regions. In countries such as Spain
and Belgium, devolution may be contributing to an increase in dual national identity.
Catalonia in Spain and Flanders in Belgium both have witnessed an increase in the
number of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity after
devolution. In the United Kingdom, particularly in Scotland, some individuals attribute
themselves with a dual national identity in the pre-1999 devolution period. It is important
to note that, as was mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, prior to the creation of
the Scottish Parliament in 1999, the central government was devolving small amounts of
power to Scotland.236 Also, the literature established a connection between national
identity and the feelings towards an independent Scotland. Individuals who attribute
themselves with a dual national identity were less likely to support the independence of
Scotland than were their exclusively Scottish counterparts. It was also established that
exclusively Scottish individuals were more likely to support the Scottish National Party
than were dual national identity individuals. All in all, the rise of regional national
identity in Europe has resulted in some central governments implementing devolution,
which has led to an increase in individuals attributing themselves with a dual national
identity, thereby reducing the desire for independence.
Furthermore, this thesis will also help fill three gaps in the literature. Firstly, the
research in this thesis will expand the knowledge by examining up to the year 2013.
Secondly, this thesis will examine how devolution is impacting nationalism by examining
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the national identity of individuals in seven key demographic categories. And thirdly, this
thesis will use new institutionalism to help explain the link between the devolved Scottish
Parliament and national identity.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODS

Data Collection
Cumulative measures of national identity, particularly in Scotland, have had little
consistency prior to the introduction of the Moreno question in 1986.237 Developed for
his PhD thesis, Luis Moreno created the Moreno question for the purposes of determining
state and regional forms of self-identification.238 Prior to this, some scholars used votes
for the Scottish National Party as proxies for increasing Scottish identity at the expense of
British identity. With the introduction of the Moreno question, scholars can now
determine an individual’s true national identity.239 This means proxies like political party
affiliation are no longer required to determine national identity trends. To determine an
individual’s national identity using the Moreno question, researchers ask respondents to
choose from five separate identities. For example, in regards to Scottish identity,
individuals can be asked the following: “Are you Scottish, not British; more Scottish than
British; equally Scottish and British; more British than Scottish; or British, not
Scottish.”240 Many organizations use the Moreno question to determine national identity
within nation-states or regions. One of those organizations is ScotCen Social Research.
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ScotCen Social Research is an independent research organization that is located in
Edinburgh, Scotland. It is part of NatCen Social Research, which is the largest research
organization in Britain. ScotCen Social Research is a non-profit organization and a
registered educational charity that is independent of government departments and
political parties. For over a decade, ScotCen Social Research has been commissioned by
the British and Scottish governments and various charities to determine the views of
Scottish people.241
To determine trends in national identity for ScotCen Social Research, researchers
Susan Reid and Anna Marcinkiewicz survey about 1,200 to 1,500 people using random
sampling. These surveys are called the Scottish Social Attitude Surveys. Using Post
Office list of addresses, which are public, Reid and Marcinkiewicz send survey requests
to each individual selected. The use of the Post Office list of addresses ensures that
everyone in Scotland has an equal chance of being selected. This allows the researchers
to provide a true representative picture of the Scottish population. It is important to note
that addresses cannot be replaced by another address, which prevents bias in the results.
If an individual agrees to partake in the survey, Reid and Marcinkiewicz send an
interviewer to the individual’s residence for a one-on-one interview. Interviewers are
employed and trained by ScotCen Social Research. They have also been checked by the
Disclosure and Barring Service. All information collected by the interviewer is kept
confidential under the Data Protection Act of 1998.242 This thesis utilizes the information
collected from the Scottish Social Attitude Surveys from ScotCen Social Research to
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determine the extensiveness of dual national identity in Scotland in the post-devolution
period.
To gather this information, What Scotland Thinks, which is run by ScotCen
Social Research, was used. More specifically, Scottish Social Attitude Surveys data from
ScotCen Social Research on What Scotland Thinks was used. These surveys, which were
funded by a variety of charitable and government sources, were carried out from 1999 to
2001, 2003, 2005 to 2007, and 2009 to 2013. It is important to note that for this thesis,
individuals who selected “more Scottish than British,” “equally Scottish and British,” and
“more British than Scottish,” were grouped into a single category called “dual national
identity.” This method was adopted from a study conducted by Anthony Heath and James
Kellas.243 Also, the group “Scottish, not “British,” was renamed to “Just Scottish
Identity.” Individuals that selected “British, not Scottish;” “Other Description;” “None of
these;” or “Refused” were removed from this study. In addition to answering the Moreno
question, respondents were also asked to group themselves within eleven demographic
groups. Respondents were allowed to place themselves in more than one group. Of these
eleven categories, this thesis used seven in its research. These seven groups included “age
group,” “sex,” “education,” “urban or rural,” “main economic activity,” “religion,” and
“party political identification.”
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For the purposes of this thesis, “age group” was changed to “age,” “sex” was changed to
“gender,” “urban or rural” was changed to “location,” “main economic activity” was
changed to “employment status,” and “party political identification,” was changed to
“political party preference.”244 Aside from being asked questions about national identity
and demographics, respondents were also asked about their preference as to how
Scotland should be governed. More specifically, respondents were asked about their
feelings towards Scottish independence.
Respondents were asked if they feel Scotland should be “independent, separate
from the United Kingdom and the European Union; independent, separate from the
United Kingdom but in the European Union; part of the United Kingdom, with an elected
Parliament that has some taxation powers; part of the United Kingdom, with an elected
Parliament that has no taxation powers;” or “part of the United Kingdom without its own
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elected Parliament.”245 For simplicity, this thesis combines individuals that selected
“independent, separate from the United Kingdom and the European Union” and
“independent, separate from the United Kingdom but in the European Union” into one
category called “independence from the United Kingdom.” This thesis also combines
individuals that selected “part of the United Kingdom, with an elected Parliament that has
some taxation powers” and “part of the United Kingdom with an elected Parliament that
has no taxation powers” into one category called “devolution.” The category of “part of
the United Kingdom without its own elected Parliament” was renamed to “no
devolution.” Individuals that selected “Don’t know” or “Refused” were removed from the
study. A comparison between national identity and feelings towards independence was
completed for each group under study. Similar to many studies, this thesis encountered
some limitations.

Limitations
Firstly, the quality of the data that was collected could have been impacted due to
the fact that it was collected using one-on-one interviews. The quality of the data that is
245
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received from one-on-one interviews often depends on the abilities of the interviewer.
There is a possibility that some interviewers from ScotCen Social Research have either
low data gathering skills or have their own biases that could impact the respondent’s
answers.246 Secondly, some data points were missing from the data provided by the
Scottish Social Attitude Surveys. For each demographic group under study, the years
2002, 2004, and 2008 were unavailable. In addition, data from 1999 to 2001 was missing
for “urban or rural.” These missing data points may have prevented this thesis from
providing a full account of trends in national identity and feelings towards independence
in the post-devolution period. And thirdly, for the demographic groups, the Scottish
Social Attitude Surveys did not provide a year-to-year breakdown of national identity and
feelings towards independence. Instead, all years after 1999 were combined, producing a
single percentage. As a result of this, this thesis could not establish a trend of national
identity and feelings towards independence from year-to-year in the post-devolution
period. Although this thesis encountered limitations, it was still able to provide an
accurate account of the effects of devolution on national identity and feelings towards
Scottish independence in the post-devolution period.
In conclusion, prior to the introduction of the Moreno question, some scholars
used votes for the Scottish National Party as proxies for increasing Scottish identity at the
expense of British identity.247 The Moreno question has eliminated the need for
researchers to use proxies for national identity. Instead, researchers can now ask
respondents to choose from five separate identities. For example, in regards to Scottish
246

Susan E. Wyse, “Advantages and Disadvantages of Face-to-Face Data Collection,” Snap Surveys, 15
October 2014, https://www.snapsurveys.com/blog/advantages-disadvantages-facetoface-data-collection/.
247
Henderson, “Identity measurement in Scotland and Quebec: The Meaning and Salience of Identity
Markers,” 270.

59

identity, individuals can be asked if they are “Scottish, not British; more Scottish than
British; equally Scottish and British; more British than Scottish; or British, not
Scottish.”248 Many organizations, such as ScotCen Social Research use the Moreno
question to determine the trends in national identity, as well as feelings towards
independence in Scotland. For this thesis, ScotCen Social Research data, which for
national identity and feelings towards independence comes in the form of Scottish Social
Attitude Surveys, was obtained using What Scotland Thinks. Individuals that attributed
themselves with being “more Scottish than British,” “equally Scottish and British,” and
“more British than Scottish,” were combined into a single group called “dual national
identity.” The group “Scottish, not British” was renamed to “Just Scottish Identity.” For
feelings towards independence, individuals that selected “independent, separate from the
United Kingdom and the European Union” and “independent, separate from the United
Kingdom but in the European Union” were combined into one category called
“independence from the United Kingdom.” Individuals that selected “part of the United
Kingdom, with an elected Parliament that has some taxation powers” and “part of the
United Kingdom with an elected Parliament that has no taxation powers” were combined
into one category called “devolution.” The category of “part of the United Kingdom
without its own elected Parliament” was renamed to “no devolution.” This thesis, like
other studies, encountered some limitations. Those limitations included potential
problems with the quality of the data, missing data points, and the fact that Scottish
Social Attitude Surveys did not provide a year-to-year breakdown for national identity
and feelings towards independence for demographic groups. However, this thesis was
still able to provide an account of the effects of devolution on national identity and
248
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feelings towards Scottish independence in the post-devolution period. All in all, this
thesis used data in the form of Scottish Social Attitude Surveys from ScotCen Social
Research to determine the extensiveness of dual national identity and feelings towards
independence in Scotland in the post-devolution period, and although it encountered
some limitations, it was still able to provide that information.

61

CHAPTER 4
RESULTS

The introduction of devolution sought to quell nationalist tensions and thereby,
reduce calls for independence in Scotland.249 In 1999, Blair’s government passed the
Scotland Act, allowing for the creation of the Scottish Parliament at Holyrood.250 In order
to determine if Blair’s devolution had an impact on national identity and feelings towards
independence, Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys from ScotCen Social Research will be
examined. More specifically, this thesis will examine if devolution has led to more
individuals attributing themselves with a dual national identity over a just Scottish
identity and therefore, leading more individuals to reject independence. As was
mentioned previously, individuals who attribute themselves with a dual national identity
are less likely to support independence than individuals who attribute themselves with an
exclusive identity. To further determine the impacts of devolution on national identity
and feelings towards independence, demographic variables were also examined. Those
variables included age, gender, education, location, employment status, religion, and
political party preferences. The following section will examine the relationship between
devolution, national identity, and feelings towards independence.
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National Identity and Independence
To determine if there is a higher number of individuals that attribute themselves
with a dual national identity during the post-devolution period in Scotland, which for the
purposes of this thesis is from 1999 to 2013, Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys from 1999
to 2001, 2003, 2005 to 2007, and 2009 to 2014 were evaluated.
The Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys show that there is no clear pattern of
increase or decrease for either just Scottish identity or dual national identity (Refer to
Figure 1 and Table 1). However, dual national identity has been consistently higher than
just Scottish identity since the introduction of the Scottish Parliament at Holyrood in
1999 (Refer to Figure 1 and Table 1). One of the most noticeable increases in dual
national identity and decrease in just Scottish identity occurred in 2012 (Refer to Figure 1
and Table 1). This was the same year that Alex Salmond, the former leader of the
Scottish National Party, revealed his plans to hold an independence referendum in
2014.251 One year following this announcement, the percentage of individuals that
attributed themselves with just Scottish identity rose from 23 percent to 25 percent at the
expense of dual national identity, which decreased from 65 percent to 62 percent (Refer
to Table 1). The lowest point for dual national identity in Scotland came one year after
the creation of the Scottish Parliament. In 1999, the percentage of individuals that
attributed themselves with a dual national identity was 60 percent (Refer to Table 1). In
2000, this percentage dropped to 55 percent (Refer to Table 1). Just Scottish identity
witnessed an increase from 32 percent in 1999 to 37 percent in 2000 (Refer to Table 1).
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Therefore, in the post-devolution period, there are more individuals that attributed
themselves with a dual national identity than individuals that attributed themselves with a
just Scottish identity.
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Figure 1: Just Scottish Identity vs. Dual National Identity Post Devolution.
Source: “Moreno National Identity,” Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys 1999-2001, 2003, 2005-2007. 2009-2014,
http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/moreno-national-identity-5#table.

TABLE 1
The Percentage of Single National Identity vs. Dual National Identity Individuals in Scotland
Post-Devolution
Just

1999

2000

2001

2003

2005

2006

2007

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

32

37

36

31

32

33

26

27

28

28

23

25

60

55

57

60

57

57

61

61

60

60

65

62

Scottish
Identity
Dual
National
Identity
Source: “Moreno National Identity,” Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys 1999-2013,
http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/moreno-national-identity-5#table.
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As was mentioned in the literature review, some studies show a correlation
between an individual’s national identity and their feelings towards Scottish
independence.252 These studies show that individuals that attributed themselves with a
dual national identity are less likely to support Scottish independence compared to those
that attributed themselves with a just Scottish identity.253 To confirm this, Scottish Social
Attitudes Surveys from the post-devolution period were examined.
The Social Surveys show that individuals that attributed themselves with a dual
national identity were less likely to support Scottish independence than were their just
Scottish identity counterparts (Refer to Figure 2). When it came to devolution compared
to no devolution, individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity are
divided. However, slightly more dual national identity individuals supported devolution
compared to no devolution (Refer to Figure 2). Therefore, in the post-devolution period,
there are more individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity and
those individuals are less likely to favour Scottish independence. The next section of this
chapter will discuss the relationship between an individual’s age and how they attribute
themselves in terms of identity. This section will also discuss the relationship between an
individual’s age and their feelings towards Scottish independence.
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Source: “ 'Moreno' national identity broken down by 'How should Scotland be governed? (five options)' All years
(1999- 2013),” Scottish Social Attitude Surveys 1999-2013, http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/moreno-nationalidentity-5/explore/scotpar2/#table.

Age, National Identity, and Feelings Towards Independence
Many developed countries are experiencing a shift in the dynamics of their
populations. Populations within these countries are becoming increasingly older.254 Since
2000, Europe has been experiencing what Wolfgang Lutz, Brian C. O’Neill, and Sergei
Scherbov call a “negative momentum” in their population. This means that many
European states are witnessing a decline in younger individuals and an increase in older
ones.255 In 2012, many European states witnessed an increase of 15 to 22 percent in the
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number of individuals who are sixty years of age or older. The United Kingdom is not an
exception to this trend. In 2007, the United Kingdom had a population of approximately
sixty-one million.256 Out of the sixty-one million, ten million of them were sixty-five
years of age or older. This number is expected to rise to sixteen million by 2032.257 Like
the rest of the United Kingdom, Scotland also has an aging population.258 In the postdevolution period in Scotland, there were more individuals that are over the age of sixty-
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Figure 3: Age Group Population of Scotland Post-Devolution.
Source: “Mid-year population estimates: Scotland and its council areas by single year of age and sex 1981 to 2015,”
National Records of Scotland, https://www.nrscotland.gov.uk/statistics-and-data/statistics/statistics-bytheme/population/population-estimates/mid-year-population-estimates/population-estimates-time-series-data.
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themselves with a dual national identity than are their younger cohorts (Refer to Table 2).
For example, 64 percent of individuals over the age of sixty-five attribute themselves
with a dual national identity (Refer to Table 2). This is compared to the 54 percent of
individuals who are between the ages of eighteen to twenty-four that attribute themselves
with a dual national identity (Refer to Table 2). When looking at just Scottish identity,
younger individuals are more likely to attribute themselves with a just Scottish identity
than are their older cohorts (Refer to Table 2). This trend is not unique to Scotland. In
Wallonia, an autonomous region in Belgium, younger individuals are more inclined to
attribute themselves with a just Walloon identity than are their older cohorts.259 However,
it should be stated that in the post-devolution period in Scotland, there was a higher
percentage of individuals in all age groups that attributed themselves with a dual national
identity compared to a just Scottish identity. With this in mind, based on the argument in
this thesis, individuals aged sixty-five years of age or older should be the most likely to
support devolution, whereas individuals aged eighteen to twenty-four should be the most
likely to support Scottish independence. To determine if this is the case, Scottish Social
Attitudes Surveys from the post-devolution period were examined.
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TABLE 2
Age Group and National Identity
18-24

25-34

35-44

45-54

55-59

60-64

65+

Just Scottish Identity

35%

31%

31%

29%

30%

29%

29%

Dual National Identity

54%

53%

59%

62%

62%

64%

64%

Source: “'Moreno' national identity broken down by 'Age group' All years (1999- 2013),”
Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys 1999-2013, http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/moreno-national-identity5/explore/RAgeCat/#explore.

During this period, individuals aged sixty-five years or older were the most likely
to support devolution (Refer to Figure 4). Individuals aged eighteen to twenty-four were
the most likely to support Scottish independence (Refer to Figure 4). It should be noted
that in all age groups, there were more individuals who supported devolution compared to
Scottish independence (Refer to Figure 4). All in all, in the post-devolution period,
individuals in all age groups were more likely to attribute themselves with a dual national
identity and more likely to support devolution. The following section of this chapter will
evaluate the association between an individual’s gender and how they attribute
themselves in terms of a national identity. This section will also discuss the correlation
between one’s gender and their feelings towards Scottish independence.
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Figure 4: Age Group and Feelings Towards Independence.
Source: “How should Scotland be governed? (five options) broken down by 'Age group' All years (1999- 2013),”
Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys 1999-2013, http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-should-scotland-begoverned-five-options-5/explore/RAgeCat/#explore.

Gender, National Identity, and Feelings Towards Scottish Independence
In North America and Europe, there is a gender imbalance. According to Peter
Lloyd-Sherlock, in North American and European countries, there are more women than
men. This is mainly due to the fact that men tend to have higher mortality rates, caused
by violent activities or accidents in early life or through chronic diseases later in life.260
This gender imbalance is also seen in the United Kingdom. In the years following
devolution, females outnumbered males by at least one million.261 Similar to the United
Kingdom, this trend was also observed in Scotland. However, because Scotland has a
260
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much smaller population than the rest of the United Kingdom, the difference between
males and females is about two hundred thousand.262 This gender imbalance in Scotland
has continued into the post-devolution period (Refer to Figure 5).
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Figure 5: The Number of Males Vs. Females in the Post-Devolution Period.
Source: “Population Estimates for UK, England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland,” Office for National
Statistics,
https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/populationestimates/datasets/populati
onestimatesforukenglandandwalesscotlandandnorthernireland.

The gender imbalance in Scotland is important because, in the post-devolution
period, females were more likely than males to attribute themselves with a dual national
identity (Refer to Table 3). However, an equal amount of females and males attribute
themselves with a just Scottish identity (Refer to Table 3). This means that, according to
the thesis, females should be more likely than males to support devolution in the post-
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devolution period. Scottish Attitudes Surveys from the post-devolution period were
examined to determine if this was the case.

TABLE 3
The Percentage of Males Vs. Females National Identity
Just Scottish Identity

Dual National Identity

Males

30%

59%

Females

30%

60%

Source: “'Moreno' national identity broken down by 'Sex' All years (1999- 2013),”
Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys 1999-2013, http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/moreno-national-identity5/explore/rsex/#explore.

An evaluation of these surveys found that during this period, females were more
likely than males to support devolution (Refer to Table 4). Males were more likely to
support Scottish independence (Refer to Table 4). According to Joane Nagel, males tend
to be the more nationalistic gender, which could explain why males in Scotland are more
likely to support Scottish independence.263 Therefore, females are more likely to attribute
themselves with dual national identity and more likely to support devolution. The next
section will discuss the correlation between one’s education and how they attribute
themselves in terms of national identity. The relationship between an individual’s
educational status and their feelings towards Scottish independence will also be
examined.
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TABLE 4
National Identity and Feelings Towards Independence
Independence

Devolution

No Devolution, But Remain Part of the United Kingdom

Male

16%

27%

12%

Female

13%

29%

10%

Source: “How should Scotland be governed? (five options) broken down by 'Sex' All years (1999-2013),” Scottish
Social Attitudes Surveys 1999-2013, http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-should-scotland-be-governed-fiveoptions-5/explore/rsex/#explore.

Education, National Identity, and Feelings Towards Independence
According to the United Kingdom’s Department of Education, there are five
stages of education. These five stages are early years, primary, secondary, further
education, and higher education.264 In Scotland, early years education is referred to as
ante-pre-school education. This means that early years education typically starts with preschool. Pre-school education can be provided by private and voluntary providers or local
authority centres.265 At the end of five or six terms of pre-school, a child then can enter
primary school. In primary school, students learn from a broad general education phase,
called the Curriculum for Excellence (CfE).266 In secondary school, the curriculum is
comprehensive and is offered for six years, with the compulsory age being 16 or S4.
Following the end of this stage, students normally enter into a range of external
examinations.267 From there, they either go into further education, higher education, or no
education.
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Further education is used to cover non-advanced courses that are taken after
compulsory education. This form of education ranges from basic skills training to higher
vocational education. These courses are taught at further education colleges.268 Higher
education usually involves undergraduate or postgraduate courses that are taught at a
recognized university.269 Compared to the rest of the United Kingdom, Scotland has a
high proportion of students in higher education.270 Lindsay Paterson claims that this is
because the Scottish education system is more socially open than any other education
system in the United Kingdom.271
The fact that Scotland has a high number of individuals enrolled in higher
education is important because these individuals were the most likely to attribute
themselves with a dual national identity (Refer to Table 5). Individuals with no
qualifications were the most likely to attribute themselves with a just Scottish identity.
However, it is important to note that in the post-devolution period, all categories have a
higher number of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity
compared to those that attribute themselves with a just Scottish identity (Refer to Table
5). With all this in mind, according to the argument of this thesis, individuals enrolled in
higher education would be the most likely to support devolution, while individuals with
no qualifications would be the most likely to support independence. Nevertheless, all
categories should have a higher number of individuals that support devolution because all
categories possessed a higher number of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual
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national identity. To determine if this is true, Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys from the
post-devolution period were examined.

TABLE 5
Educational Status and National Identity
Degree/

Higher

Highers/A

Standard

Standard

No

Postgraduate

Education

Levels or

Grades 1-3/

Grades 4-

Qualifications

Degree

Below

Equivalent

GCSEs or

7/CSE or

Equivalent

Equivalent

Degree
Just

14%

29%

29%

36%

37%

38%

65%

63%

63%

58%

58%

54%

Scottish
Identity
Dual
National
Identity
Source: “'Moreno' national identity broken down by 'Education' All years (1999- 2013),” Scottish Social
Attitudes Surveys 1999-2013, http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/moreno-national-identity5/explore/HEdQual/#explore.

The surveys showed that in the post-devolution period, individuals with a degree
or postgraduate degree were the most likely to support devolution (Refer to Table 6).
However, individuals with no qualifications were not the most likely to support
independence (Refer to Table 6). Individuals with standard grades 4-7/CSE or Equivalent
were the most likely to favour Scottish independence (Refer to Table 6). However, all
categories possessed a higher number of individuals that supported devolution during the
post-devolution period (Refer to Table 6). Thus, all categories have a higher number of
individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity and have a higher
number of individuals that support devolution in the post-devolution period. The ensuing
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section will examine the association between living in a rural or urban environment and
one’s national identity. This section will discuss the relationship between where an
individual’s lives and their feelings towards Scottish independence.

TABLE 6
National Identity and Feelings Towards Independence
Independence

Devolution

Degree/Postgrad

11%

33%

No Devolution, But Remain Part of the
United Kingdom
11%

Higher Education Below

15%

28%

11%

14%

29%

11%

16%

26%

10%

17%

25%

12%

15%

26%

11%

Degree
Highers/A Levels or
Equivalent
Standard grades 1-3/ GCSEs
or Equivalent
Standard grades 4-7/CSE or
Equivalent
No Qualifications

Source: “How should Scotland be governed? (five options) broken down by 'Education' All years (1999- 2013),”
Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys 1999-2013, http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-should-scotland-begoverned-five-options-5/explore/HEdQual/#explore.

Location, National Identity, and Feelings Towards Scottish Independence
The Scottish government divides Scotland up into six categories. The first
category is Large Urban Areas, which contain population centres that have 125,000
people or more. The second category is Other Urban Areas, which contain population
centres that have 10,000 to 124,999 people. The third category is Accessible Small
Towns, which contain population centres that have 3,000 to 9,999 people and are within a
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thirty-minute drive from a population centre that has ten thousand people or more. The
fourth category is Remote Small Towns, which contain population centres that have
3,000 to 9,999 people and are within a drive of over thirty-minutes from population
centres that have 10,000 people or more. The fifth category is Accessible Rural Areas,
which contain a population of less than 3,000 people and are within a thirty-minute drive
from a population centre that has 10,000 people or more. The final category is Remote
Rural Areas, which contain a population of less than 3,000 people and are a drive that is
over thirty-minutes from a population centre that has 10,000 people or more.272 In a
report published by the Scottish government in 2014, approximately 35 percent of
Scotland’s population are located in Large Urban Areas, 35 percent are located in Other
Urban Areas, 9 percent are located Accessible Small Towns, 3 percent are located in
Remote Small Towns, 11 percent are located in Accessible Rural Areas, and 6 percent are
located in Remote Rural Areas.273 Although most people in Scotland live in Large Urban
Areas or Other Urban Areas, Accessible Small Towns and Accessible Rural Areas are
important in terms of dual national identity (Refer to Table 7 and 8).
According to Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys 2003-2013, both Accessible Small
Towns and Accessible Rural Areas have the highest number of individuals that attribute
themselves with a dual national identity at 62 percent (Refer to Table 8). Remote Small
Town and Remote Rural Area have the lowest number of individuals that attribute
themselves with a dual national identity (Refer to Table 8). However, all areas in
Scotland possessed a higher number of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual

272

Scotland, Rural and Environment Science and Analytical Services, Scottish Government Urban/Rural
Classification: 2013-2014, [Edinburgh], 2014, 5, http://www.gov.scot/Resource/0046/00464780.pdf.
273
Ibid., 16.

77

national identity compared to those that attribute themselves with a just Scottish identity.
With this information, although comparatively Accessible Small Towns and Accessible
Rural Areas should possess the most individuals that support devolution, all areas should
possess more individuals that support devolution over independence.
TABLE 7
The Approximate Percentage of the Population Living in Large Urban Areas, Other Urban
Areas, Accessible Small Towns, Remote Small Towns, Accessible Rural Areas, and Remote Rural
Areas
2003-2004

2005-2006

2007-2008

2009-2010

2011-2012

Large Urban Areas

39%

39%

39%

39%

39%

Other Urban Areas

29%

30%

30%

31%

30%

Accessible Small Towns

10%

9%

9%

9%

9%

Remote Small Towns

3%

4%

4%

4%

4%

Accessible Rural Areas

13%

12%

11%

12%

12%

Remote Rural Areas

6%

6%

7%

7%

7%

Source: “Urban and Rural Classification,” The Scottish Government,
http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/About/Methodology/UrbanRuralClassification.

TABLE 8
Location and National Identity

Just

Large

Other

Accessible

Remote

Accessible

Remote

Urban

Urban

Small Town

Small Town

Rural Area

Rural Area

Area

Areas

26%

31%

31%

32%

27%

26%

60%

61%

62%

56%

62%

56%

Scottish
Identity
Dual
National
Identity
Source: “'Moreno' national identity broken down by 'Urban or rural area (six categories)' All years (2003- 2013),”
Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys 2003-2013, http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/moreno-national-identity5/explore/urindsc2/#explore.
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The Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys from the post-devolution period showed
that Remote Rural Areas had the highest number of individuals that support devolution
(Refer to Table 9). It is important to note that comparatively, Remote Rural Areas had
one of the lowest numbers of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national
identity. Accessible Small Towns, which had one of the highest numbers of individuals
that attribute themselves with a dual national identity, had the lowest number of
individuals that support devolution (Refer to Table 9). This is different to the findings in
the four previous sections. However, individuals in all areas in Scotland were more likely
to support devolution (Refer to Table 9). In sum, all areas possessed a high percentage of
individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity and a high percentage
of individuals that support devolution. The following section of this chapter will review
the relationship between individual’s employment status and how they attribute
themselves in terms of national identity. This section will look at the relationship between
an individual’s employment status and their feelings towards Scottish independence.
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TABLE 9
Location and Feelings Towards Independence
Independence

Devolution

No Devolution, But Remain Part of the United
Kingdom

Large Urban

15%

28%

9%

Other Urban Area

15%

27%

11%

Accessible Small

14%

26%

15%

14%

27%

11%

13%

28%

12%

13%

29%

11%

Area

Town
Remote Small
Town
Accessible Rural
Area
Remote Rural
Area
Source: “How should Scotland be governed? (five options) broken down by 'Urban or rural area (six categories)' All
years (2002- 2013),” Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys 2002-2013, http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-shouldscotland-be-governed-five-options-5/explore/urindsc2/#explore.

Employment Status, National Identity, and Feelings Towards Independence
In the United Kingdom, there are regional disparities when it comes to
employment. When evaluating the employment rates between regions in the United
Kingdom during the winter months of 1999 and 2000, Stephen Fothergill found that
Scotland, along with Wales and Northern England, had the lowest employment rates.274
To increase the employment rate in these areas to match that of the south east of England,

274

Stephen Fothergill, “The True Scale of the Regional Problem in the UK,” Regional Studies 35, no. 3
(2001): 245,
http://journals2.scholarsportal.info.ezproxy.uwindsor.ca/pdf/00343404/v35i0003/241_ttsotrpitu.xml.

80

1.5 million jobs would have to be added to the United Kingdom.275 However, during the
post-devolution period, Scotland’s employment rate has been steadily increasing, with the
exception of the years between 2008 and 2010 (Refer to Figure 6). The decline between
2008 to 2010 was related to the global recession, which impacted global financial sectors
and negatively impacted global trade.276 When comparing all the countries in the United
Kingdom during the post-devolution period, Scotland’s employment rate is the second
highest (Refer to Figure 6). Employment rate is important when it comes to dual national
identity.
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Figure 6: United Kingdom Employments Rates Post-Devolution.
Source: “High Level Summary of Statistics Trends,” The Scottish Government,
http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistics/Browse/Labour-Market/TrendData.
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According to Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys from the post-devolution period,
individuals who were employed were the second most likely to attribute themselves with
a dual national identity at 60 percent (Refer to Table 10). Individuals who were once
employed, but now are retired, were the most likely to attribute themselves with a dual
national identity at 64 percent (Refer to Table 10). Individuals who were unemployed
were the most likely to attribute themselves with a just Scottish identity at 38 percent
(Refer to Table 10). However, during this period, all categories possessed a higher
number of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity compared to
those that attribute themselves with a just Scottish identity (Refer to Table 10). According
to this thesis, although retired individuals, followed by employed individuals, should be
the most likely to support devolution, all categories should have a higher number of
individuals that support devolution compared to those that support independence.

TABLE 10
National Identity and Employment Status
Employed

Unemployed

Retired

Just Scottish Identity

29%

38%

28%

Dual National Identity

60%

53%

64%

Source: “'Moreno' national identity broken down by 'Main economic activity ' All years (1999- 2013),” Scottish Social
Attitudes Surveys 1999-2013, http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/moreno-national-identity5/explore/REconSum/#explore.

Retired individuals, followed by currently employed individuals, were more likely
than unemployed individuals to support devolution at 30 percent and 28 percent
respectively (Refer to Table 11). Nevertheless, in the post-devolution period, all
categories possessed a higher number of individuals that supported devolution compared
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to those that support Scottish independence (Refer to Table 11). Therefore, although
retired and employed individuals were more likely than unemployed individuals to
support devolution, all categories possessed a higher percentage of individuals that
attribute themselves with a dual national identity and a higher percentage of individuals
that supported devolution. In the next section, the association between an individual’s
religion and how one attributes themselves in terms of national identity was evaluated.
The relationship between an individual’s religion and their feelings towards the
independence of Scotland will also be discussed.

TABLE 11
National Identity and Feelings Towards Independence
Independence

Devolution

No Devolution, But Remain Part of the United Kingdom

Employed

15%

28%

10%

Unemployed

21%

22%

5%

Retired

11%

30%

15%

Source: “How should Scotland be governed? (five options) broken down by 'Main economic activity ' All years (19992013),” Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys 1999-2013, http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-should-scotland-begoverned-five-options-5/explore/REconSum/#explore.

Religion, National Identity, and Feelings Towards Independence
According to the Scottish census of 2001, the Church of Scotland has the highest
number of followers of any religion in Scotland. The census found that of Scotland’s five
million residents, 42 percent of them claimed to be part of the Church of Scotland (Refer
to Table 12). Roman Catholicism followed in a distant second, with only 16 percent of
the Scottish population claiming to belong to the Roman Catholic Church (Refer to Table
12). In the 2011 census, it was found that the Church of Scotland experienced a decline in
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its fellowship to 32 percent (Refer to Table 12). While the percentage of individuals for
most religions increased from 2001 to 2011, the percentage of individuals that claimed to
have no religious affiliation increased the most significantly. The number of individuals
that claimed to have no religious affiliation surpassed those who claimed to be affiliated
with the Church of Scotland (Refer to Table 12). This increase in the number of
individuals that claimed to have no religious affiliation is not unique to Scotland. In
England and Wales, individuals that claimed to be non-religious rose from 15 percent in
2001 to 25 percent in 2011.277 Although the number of individuals with no religious
affiliation has increased significantly from 2001 to 2011, the Church of Scotland still has
a high percentage of the Scottish population in their fellowship (Refer to Table 12).
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TABLE 12
Religious Affiliation in Scotland
2001 (Population=

2011 (Population=

5,062,000)

5,295,000)

Number of Individuals

Percentage

Number of Individuals

Percentage

2,146,000

42.4

1,718,000

32.4

804,000

15.9

841,000

15.9

347,000

6.9

291,000

5.5

Buddhist

7,000

0.1

13,000

0.2

Hindu

6,000

0.1

16,000

0.3

Jewish

6,000

0.1

6,000

0.1

Muslim

43,000

0.8

77,000

1.4

Sikh

7,000

0.1

9,000

0.2

Other

8,000

0.2

15,000

0.3

1,409,000

27.8

1,941,000

36.7

Church of
Scotland
Roman
Catholic
Other
Christian

Religion
No Religion

Source: “Scottish Census 2001 and 2011,” National Records of Scotland,
http://www.scotlandscensus.gov.uk/documents/censusresults/release2a/rel2asbtable7.pdf.

The high number of individuals that follow the Church of Scotland is important
because these individuals are the most likely to attribute themselves with a dual national
identity at 66 percent (Refer to Table 13). Individuals that follow the Roman Catholic
Church were the most likely to attribute themselves with a just Scottish identity at 34
percent (Refer to Table 13). However, all the categories possessed a higher number of
individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity compared to those that
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attribute themselves with a just Scottish identity. According to this thesis, individuals
who follow the Church of Scotland should be the most likely to support devolution,
whereas individuals who follow the Roman Catholic Church should be the most likely to
support Scottish independence. Nevertheless, because all categories had a higher number
of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity, all categories should
have a higher number of individuals that support devolution. Scottish Social Attitudes
Surveys from the post-devolution period were examined to determine if this was the case.

TABLE 13
Religious Affiliation and National Identity

Just Scottish

Church of

Roman

Other

Non-

No

Scotland

Catholic

Christian

Christian

Religion

30%

34%

19%

18%

33%

66%

55%

61%

47%

57%

Identity
Dual National
Identity
Source: “'Moreno' national identity broken down by 'Religion' All years (1999- 2013),” Scottish Social Attitudes
Surveys 1999-2013, http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/moreno-national-identity-5/explore/RelgSumS/#explore.

The surveys showed that during this period, individuals who follow the Church of
Scotland were one of the groups that were most likely to support devolution at 30 percent
(Refer to Table 14). Individuals who followed the Roman Catholic Church were the most
likely to support Scottish independence at 17 percent (Refer to Table 14). However, all
categories had a higher number of individuals that supported devolution compared to
those that support Scottish independence. In sum, all the categories possessed a higher
number of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity and a higher
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number of individuals that support devolution. The following section will look at the
correlation between an individual’s political party preference and their feelings towards
Scottish independence.

TABLE 14
Religious Affiliation, National Identity, and Feelings Towards Independence
Independence

Devolution

No Devolution, But Remain Part of the United
Kingdom

Church of

11%

30%

14%

17%

26%

9%

11%

30%

13%

Non-Christian

16%

26%

6%

No Religion

16%

27%

9%

Scotland
Roman
Catholic
Other
Christian

Source: “How should Scotland be governed? (five options) broken down by 'Religion' All years (1999- 2013),” Scottish
Social Attitudes Surveys 1999-2013, http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-should-scotland-be-governed-fiveoptions-5/explore/RelgSumS/#explore.

Political Party Preference, National Identity, and Feelings Towards Scottish
Independence
In 1934, the Scottish Party and the National Party of Scotland merged to create
the Scottish National Party. The party was formed on the basis of a Home Rule Policy for
Scotland. Cunninghame Graham became the first Honorary President, while The Duke of
Montrose became the first President and Sir Alexander MacEwen became the first
Chairman. Most of the chief officers in the Scottish National Party were chosen from the
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Scottish Party. Although the Scottish National Party was created through the merger
between the Scottish Party and the National Party of Scotland, the Scottish National
Party’s policies towards the United Kingdom reflected those of the Scottish Party.278
The Scottish Party policy never mentioned Scottish independence. Instead, it
focused on Scotland’s contribution to the development of the United Kingdom and the
fact that Scottish ideas needed to be incorporated into English law and life.279 This was in
contrast to the National Party of Scotland’s policy towards the United Kingdom. The
National Party of Scotland’s policy of 1928 emphasized an independent Scotland. The
Scots Independent, a nationalistic Scottish newspaper, stated that the goal of the National
Party of Scotland policy was to “restore to the ancient Scots Nation and the People their
former Freedom to govern themselves.”280
For the Scottish National Party, self-government for Scotland would come by
enabling Scotland to become an equal partner in the United Kingdom, giving it the same
status as England. To achieve this, the Scottish National Party proposed four objectives.
The first objective was to create a Scottish Parliament that would have ultimate authority
over all Scottish affairs, including taxation and finance. The second objective was for
“Scotland to share with England the rights and responsibilities they as Mother Nations
have jointly created and incurred within the British Empire.” The third objective was for
Scotland and England to create dual mechanisms to deal with the responsibilities
discussed above, as well as with matters relating to defence, foreign policy, and customs.
And the last objective was for the Scottish National Party to be independent of all other
278

H.J. Hanham, Scottish Nationalism (London, United Kingdom: Faber and Faber, 1969), 163.
Ibid.
280
“Our story so far,” Scots Independent, last modified 2015, http://scotsindependent.scot/?page_id=97;
Hanham, Scottish Nationalism, 163.
279

88

political parties.281 In addition to their self-government policy, the Scottish National Party
also created a new membership policy.
The Scottish National Party policy for membership stated that as long as an
individual adheres to the self-government policy, they would be allowed to join the party.
Also, the Scottish National Party stated that the party would be non-sectarian. With the
new self-government and membership policies in place, the Scottish National Party
believed that they would preform well in the 1935 general election. However, this would
not be the case. In the urban heartland of Scotland, the Scottish National Party performed
poorly.282 The Scots Independent claimed that this failure was mainly due to the merger
between the Scottish Party and the National Party of Scotland. The Scottish nationalistic
newspaper claimed that this merger weakened the enthusiasm of many nationalists in
Scotland.
In light of their poor performance, John MacCormick, the Secretary for the
Scottish National Party and advocate for Scottish Home Rule, was determined to unite all
Home Rule elements in Scotland.283 To do this, MacCormick sought the approval of the
party at a special convention in 1936 to start negotiations with the Liberals and the
Labour Party to establish links between the Scottish National Party and these two parties.
His request was granted and the Scottish National Party entered into negotiations with the
two parties for the next three years.284 However, the potential results of these negotiations
were never realized.
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The Scottish National Party became preoccupied with the approaching war. Most
conferences became about the rise of Nazism in Germany and how to react in the event
that a war broke out. In 1937, the Scottish National Party passed a policy stating that they
would not support Britain in the war, should one start. However, when the war did start,
the majority of Scottish National Party members ignored that policy. As the war
progressed, discontent within the Scottish National Party grew. Many of its members
were upset by the fact that Scottish National Party leaders were not taking a stronger
stance on industrial conscription. By the conference in 1942, dissidents within the party
grew stronger and a battle ensued on how the party should move forward.285 After the
resignation of MacCormick, dissidents within the party nominated Douglas Young to
become the party’s Chairman, against MaCormick’s wishes.286 With this, the Scottish
National Party was starting to look more like the National Party of Scotland.287
Although the Scottish National Party’s policies started to mirror the National
Party of Scotland’s, that changed after the election of Dr. Robert D. McIntyre as the
party’s leader.288 To deal with the growing number of dissidents within the party,
McIntyre tightened party discipline and suspended numerous members. Other members
resigned because they did not like the direction McIntyre was taking the party. At the
general conference in 1947, McIntyre focused on unity. This created greater cohesion at
annual conferences. Since then, there have not been any successful attempts to divert the
party from McIntyre’s vision.289
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In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Scottish National Party adopted a campaign
strategy that focused on municipal elections and contesting parliamentary elections in
areas where the party was well-established. Although the Scottish National Party
performed well in municipal elections, they only made minor advances in both United
Kingdom and Scottish Parliamentary elections.290 This changed in 2007. The Scottish
National Party would form its first minority government in Scotland at Holyrood by
securing forty-seven out of a potential 129 seats.291 In 2011, the Scottish National Party
formed its first majority government by winning sixty-nine seats at Holyrood.292 This
electoral success also benefited the Scottish National Party in terms of membership.
According to a House of Commons Library research briefing, out of the United
Kingdom’s seven major political parties, the Scottish National Party ranks third overall in
terms of membership size. The briefing stated that the Labour Party has the highest
membership at 515,000, followed by the Conservative Party at 149,800 members and the
Scottish National Party at 120,000 members. For the Scottish National Party, this
represents 0.26 percent of the total British electorate.293 Therefore, based on membership,
the Scottish National Party has grown to become one of the United Kingdom’s largest
political parties.
The growth of the Scottish National Party may negatively impact the total number
of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity. According to
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Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys from the post-devolution period, the Scottish National
Party had one of the lowest numbers of individuals that attributed themselves with a dual
national identity at 49 percent (Refer to Table 15). They also had the highest number of
individuals that attributed themselves with a just Scottish identity at 47 percent (Refer to
Table 15). The second largest political party in the United Kingdom, the Conservative
Party, had the highest number of individuals that attributed themselves with a dual
national identity at 69 percent (Refer to Table 15). However, all parties had a higher
number of individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity compared
to those that attributed themselves with a just Scottish identity (Refer to Table 15). With
this in mind, the thesis statement suggests that individuals that affiliated themselves with
the Scottish National Party will be the most likely to support Scottish Independence,
whereas individuals that affiliated themselves with the Conservative Party will be the
most likely to support devolution. Also, because all categories have more individuals that
attributed themselves with a dual national identity than with a just Scottish identity, they
all should have a higher number of individuals that support devolution over those that
support Scottish independence.
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TABLE 15
Political Party Affiliation and National Identity

Just

The

Scottish

The

The Liberal

The

Another

No

Labour

National

Conservative

Democrats

Green

Party

Party

Party

Party

Party

28%

47%

17%

19%

17%

25%

36%

63%

49%

69%

66%

59%

53%

49%

Party

Scottish
Identity
Dual
National
Identity
Source: “'Moreno' national identity broken down by 'Party political identification' All years (1999- 2013),” Scottish
Social Attitudes Surveys 1999-2013, http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/moreno-national-identity5/explore/partyid/#explore.

According to Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys from the post-devolution period,
individuals that affiliated themselves with the Scottish National Party were the most
likely to support Scottish independence at 30 percent (Refer to Table 16). Unlike in most
of the previous sections, the group that had the most individuals that attributed
themselves with a dual national identity does not have the most individuals that supported
devolution. The Liberal Democrats have the most individuals that support devolution at
36 percent (Refer to Table 16). Another difference between this section and most of the
previous ones is that although all categories had more individuals that attributed
themselves with a dual national identity compared to a just Scottish identity, not all
categories had more individuals that supported devolution compared to Scottish
independence (Refer to Table 16). The Scottish National Party had more individuals that
supported Scottish independence compared to those that supported devolution (Refer to
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Table 16). Thus, although all categories had more individuals that attributed themselves
with a dual national identity, the Scottish National Party had more individuals that
supported Scottish independence compared to those that supported devolution.

TABLE 16
Party Affiliation and Feelings Towards Independence
Independence

Devolution

No Devolution, But Remain Part of the United
Kingdom

The Labour Party

11%

33%

9%

Scottish National

30%

18%

2%

5%

29%

30%

8%

36%

12%

The Green Party

15%

29%

10%

Other Party

22%

21%

10%

No Party

15%

23%

13%

Party
The Conservative
Party
The Liberal
Democrats

Source: “How should Scotland be governed? (five options) broken down by 'Party political identification' All years
(1999- 2013),” Scottish Social Attitudes Surveys 1999-2013, http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/how-shouldscotland-be-governed-five-options-5/explore/partyid/#explore.

Conclusion
In conclusion, this research shows that in the surveyed population, as well as the
demographic categories under study, devolution from 1999 to 2013 has resulted in a
higher number of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity
compared to those that attribute themselves with a just Scottish identity. For example, no
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matter one’s employment status, all individuals that were surveyed in this demographic
category were more likely to attribute themselves with a dual national identity compared
to a just Scottish identity. In addition, all categories that had a higher number of
individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity were more likely to
support devolution over independence, with the exception of the Scottish National Party.
This means that a high percentage of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual
national identity is important for maintaining the unity of the United Kingdom. For
example, individuals that supported the Labour Party were more likely to attribute
themselves with a dual national identity and more likely to support devolution over
independence. It is important to note that a comparison between the pre- and postdevolution periods was completed in the next section. To remain consistent, this thesis
used data starting in 1992 to make the comparison between the two periods. The year
1992 was the first year that the Moreno question was utilized in a survey.294 All in all,
this research has shown that devolution has increased the number of individuals that
attribute themselves with a dual national identity and the number of individuals that
support devolution over independence in the post-devolution period.
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CHAPTER 5
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

National Identity and Feelings Towards Independence
Using Scottish Social Attitude Surveys from ScotCen Social Research, this thesis
was able to show that dual national identity in Scotland has been consistently higher than
just Scottish identity in the post-devolution period, which in this thesis is from 1999 to
2013. This is similar to what some scholars found in their research of national identity in
the post-devolution period. For example, Alison Park, John Curtice, Katarine Thomson,
Lindsey Jarvis, and Catherine Bromley found that from 1999 to 2000, the percentage of
individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity was higher than those
that attributed themselves with a just Scottish identity.295 Ross Bond and Michael Rosie
also found similar results in their study of national identity in the post-devolution period.
From 1999 to 2001, the percentage of individuals that attributed themselves with a dual
national identity was higher than those that attributed themselves with a just Scottish
identity. In fact, during this period, the percentage of individuals that attributed
themselves with a dual national identity increased while the percentage of individuals that
attributed themselves with a just Scottish identity decreased.296 John Curtice also studied
national identity in Scotland, but just looked at the year 2003. He also found that there
were more individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity than those
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that attributed themselves with a just Scottish identity.297 To determine if this trend
existed prior to the 1999 devolution, a comparison was completed using previous
research and the results from this thesis.
According to Figure 7, dual national identity in Scotland has been consistently
higher than just Scottish identity since 1992. It is important to note that after a review of
the literature, it appears that 1992 was the first year where the Moreno question was
employed in a survey.298 The fact that dual national identity was higher than just Scottish
identity prior to the 1999 devolution may be because Westminster had been devolving
small amounts of power to Scotland. An example of an early form of devolution was the
creation of the Scottish Office.299 Starting in 1992, it is evident that just Scottish identity
increases at the expense of dual national identity. This could be attributed to the fact that
for most of the 1990s, Scotland was run by a Conservative Government. The
Conservatives enacted policies that were opposed by most of the Scottish population.
One of those policies was the poll tax, which was enacted in Scotland one year before it
was enacted in England or Wales, causing frustration among the Scottish population.300
Another potential contributing factor to the increase in just Scottish identity was the
referendum on Scottish independence that was held in 1997.301 In 1999, Scotland would
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hold its first devolved parliamentary elections.302 This may have also contributed to the
increase in just Scottish identity. In 2001, however, just Scottish identity started to
decline while dual national identity started to increase (Refer to Figure 7). In addition,
this thesis also showed that national identity and feelings towards independence were
related.
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Figure 7: Trends in National Identity in the Pre- and Post-Devolution Period.
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This thesis found that individuals who attributed themselves with a just Scottish
identity were more likely than their dual national identity counterparts to support Scottish
independence. This means that a high percentage of individuals that attribute themselves
with a dual national identity in the post-devolution period is important for maintaining
the unity of the United Kingdom. This trend, however, was also present in the predevolution period. Anthony Heath and James Kellas discovered in their 1998 study that
individuals that attributed themselves with a just Scottish identity were more likely than
their dual national identity counterparts to support Scottish independence.303 The
relationship between devolution, national identity, and feelings towards independence is
not only present in Scotland.
In the autonomous region of Catalonia, it has been found that there is a
relationship between national identity and feelings towards independence. After the
merger between Catalonia and Spain, many Catalans felt repressed. Catalonia was
absorbed by Spain when King Ferdinand II of Aragon married Queen Isabella I of
Castile.304 In response to this perceived repression, Catalans used political means to make
their voices heard in Spain.305 In 1941, two political parties, Unified Socialist Party of
Catalonia and Catalonia’s Republican Left created the Assembly of Catalonia.306 The aim
of this Assembly was to create momentum towards an independent Catalonia.307 After the
death of Francisco Franco in 1975, Catalonia was successful in attaining a status of
autonomy through the 1978 Constitution, as well as through the Statute of Autonomy for
303

Heath and Kellas, “Nationalism and Constitutional Questions,” 118.
Montserrat Guibernau, “Spain: Catalonia and the Basque Country,” Journal of Parliamentary Affairs
53, no. 1 (2000): 55,
http://journals1.scholarsportal.info.ezproxy.uwindsor.ca/details/00312290/v53i0001/55_scatbc.xml.
305
Guibernau, “Prospects for an Independent Catalonia,” 10.
306
Ibid., 11.
307
Ibid.
304

99

Catalonia of 1979.308 More specifically, Spain began to devolve power to Catalonia in
1978. The 1979 Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia was a product of the 1978
constitution.309 The Statute provides Catalonia with the right to its own governmental
institutions, as well as allowing for the return of national symbols, such as the Catalan
flag.310 The Statute also provided the framework for the relationship between Catalonia
and Spain.311 The devolution of power to Catalonia in 1978, according to some, has
fostered dual national identities.312
According to Luis Moreno and Ana Arriba, who examined nationalism in
Catalonia in 1986, 1991, and 1994, there were more individuals that attributed
themselves with a dual national identity than there were individuals that attributed
themselves with a just Catalan identity.313 Also, similar to what was found in this thesis
for Scotland, researchers that study Catalonia claim that identity and feelings towards
independence are related.314 In studies conducted by Ivan Serrano and Jordi Argelaguet,
they found that individuals that attributed themselves with a just Catalan identity were
more likely to support the independence of Catalonia compared to their dual national
identity counterparts in the post-devolution period.315 Therefore, according to studies,
devolution in Catalonia has resulted in the fostering of dual national identities, and these
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individuals are less likely to support independence from Spain. The next section of this
chapter will discuss the background leading up to and the importance of the demographic
findings of this thesis in regards to the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum.

How Individuals Voted in the Scottish Independence Referendum of 2014
For the first two terms of the devolved Scottish Parliament, a Labour and LiberalDemocrat party coalition made up the Scottish executive. This changed, however, in May
of 2007. During the 2007 Scottish Parliamentary elections, the Scottish National Party
won the most seats, forming its first minority government in Scotland. In August of 2007,
the Scottish National Party started a National Conversation on Scotland’s constitutional
future. To respond to this, the British Government created the Commission on Scottish
Devolution, also known as the Calman Commission, in April of 2008. The goal of this
commission was to study different options for constitutional reform in the United
Kingdom. The commission was not able to draw in all political parties. Only pro-union
parties were involved. In June of 2009, the commission released its final report. The
report recommended minor devolution to Scotland and an enhancement of tax-raising
powers for the Scottish Government. By November of 2009, the Scottish Government
released its White Paper, which discussed its own constitutional preferences for Scotland.
Those preferences included maximum devolution and independence. By May of 2011,
the Scottish National Party would reach a historic milestone in their party’s history.316
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The result of the Scottish Parliamentary election of 2011 left the Scottish National
Party with the majority of seats, forming its first majority government at Holyrood. With
its majority government, the Scottish National Party was now in a position to implement
its manifesto on Scottish independence. Although the British Government initially argued
that, because of the Scotland Act of 1998, the Scottish Government had no legal power to
hold a referendum on independence, they would eventually accept it, stating that the
people of Scotland were entitled to this referendum. Disputes between the British and
Scottish governments over the terms of the referendum were settled by the Edinburgh
Agreement of 2012. Some of those terms included that only one question (yes or no to
independence) be allowed, that the referendum be held before the end of 2014, that the
conduct of the referendum should follow the principles in the Political Parties, Elections,
and Referendums Act of 2000, that only individuals living in Scotland are eligible to
vote, and that 16 and 17 year olds be allowed to vote if the Scottish Government so
chooses. The terms were brought into effect by an Order under section 30 of the Scotland
Act of 1998. This gave the Scottish Government power to hold the referendum.317
The referendum campaign began in late May 2014. During the campaign, there
was the Yes campaign, which favoured leaving the United Kingdom, and the No
campaign, which favoured remaining in the United Kingdom. At the start of the
campaign, most opinion polls showed a substantial lead for the No campaign. This lead,
however, changed over the course of the campaign. Nearing the end of the campaign,
several polls were reporting that support for the Yes campaign was increasing, cutting
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into the No campaign’s lead.318 On September 18th 2014, Scots went to the polls to
determine the future of their country. At the polls, individuals were asked to answer yes
or not to the following question, “Should Scotland be an independent country.”319 Of the
4,283,938 eligible to vote, 3,623,344 casted a ballot. This means that voter turnout was
84.6 percent.320 This voter turnout was the highest in any election held in the United
Kingdom since 1918.321 At the end of a very lengthy campaign, Scotland would vote no
to independence. The ballots showed that the No Campaign received 55.3 percent of the
vote, whereas the Yes campaign only received 44.7 percent of the vote.322 As previously
stated, this thesis found that individuals who attributed themselves with a just Scottish
identity were more likely to support independence compared to their dual national
identity counterparts prior to the referendum. To determine if this remained the case
when it came time to vote, polling data on national identity and voting was examined.
According to a study conducted by the Daily Record newspaper, individuals that
attributed themselves with a dual national identity, except for those that said they were
more Scottish than British, voted no to independence. When combining all dual national
identities together, 69.5 percent voted no, while 30.5 percent voted yes. For individuals
that attributed themselves with a just Scottish identity, 88.6 percent voted yes, whereas
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11.4 percent voted no.323 These statistics show that the results found for national identity
in this thesis were in line with how people actually voted in the referendum.
As was also shown in this thesis, when it came to age, all age groups had a higher
percentage of individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity
compared to those that attributed themselves with a just Scottish identity. However, the
results showed that individuals aged 60-64 and 65 and older were the most likely to
attribute themselves with a dual national identity. The data provided also showed that
these individuals were less likely to support independence prior to the 2014 referendum.
At the referendum, this still remained the case.324 For example, a poll conducted by Lord
Ashcroft showed that 73 percent of individuals aged 65 years and older voted no to
independence, compared to the 27 percent of them that voted yes.325 This finding is
important because it shows that the data in this thesis was in line with how people voted
in terms of age. To determine if the data in this thesis was conforming with how people
actually voted in the referendum in terms of gender, various polling data was examined.
This thesis found that when comparing females to males, females were more
likely than males to attribute themselves with a dual national identity. It is important to
note, however, that between males, there were more that attributed themselves with a
dual national identity. As a result, it was found that when comparing females to males,
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females were less likely than males to support independence leading up to the 2014
referendum, although between males, there were more supporting devolution compared
to independence. With this in mind, it should be expected, based on the findings of this
thesis, that although both genders should have voted no in the referendum, there should
be a higher percentage of females voting no compared to males. To determine if this was
the case, a poll conducted by Lord Ashcroft was examined.
The poll found that more females voted no compared to males, although between
males, there was a higher percentage of them that voted no compared to yes. According
to the poll, 56 percent of females voted no, whereas 44 percent voted yes to
independence. For males, 53 percent voted no, whereas 47 percent voted yes.326 This poll
confirms what was expected based on the results of this thesis.
As was shown in the results, no matter your level of education, most individuals
were more likely to attribute themselves with a dual national identity than with a just
Scottish identity. However, individuals with a degree or postgraduate degree were the
most likely to attribute themselves with a dual national identity and the least likely to
attribute themselves with a just Scottish identity compared to the other categories under
study. With this, the data also showed that individuals with a degree or postgraduate
degree were the least likely to support independence leading up to the referendum. This
proved to be the case on the day of voting. Studies conducted by the Scottish Referendum
Study and by the Daily Record newspaper found that most individuals with a degree or
postgraduate degree voted no. More specifically, in the Scottish Referendum Study, 51.7
percent of individuals with a degree or postgraduate degree voted no, whereas 48.3
326
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percent voted yes. The poll conducted by the Daily Mail newspaper found similar results,
but a different distribution. They found that of these individuals, 52.9 percent voted no,
whereas 47.1 percent voted yes.327 A poll by Graphic News was also examined to
determine if the data presented in this thesis was in line with how people voted in the
referendum based on their location.
This thesis found that in every location, there were more individuals that
attributed themselves with a dual national identity compared to a just Scottish identity. It
was also found that in every location, more individuals supported devolution over
independence prior to the referendum. It would be assumed, then, that when it came to
voting in the referendum, all locations should have voted no. As it turns out, this was not
the case. For example, in the local authority of Dundee City, 99.5 percent of the residents
are classified as living in a large urban area.328 When it came time to vote, the Graphic
News poll found that in Dundee City, the majority of residents voted yes. Glasgow City is
another example of a local authority that has a high number of individuals classified as
living in a large urban area. Most residents in Glasgow City voted yes as well. It is
important to note that besides Dundee City, Glasgow City, North Lanarkshire, and West
Dunbartonshire, the other 28 local authorities voted no in the referendum.329 According to
Steven Ayres, a statistical researcher for the House of Commons Library, there is a
positive correlation between individuals who voted yes and those who claim out-of-work
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benefits. The local authorities of Dundee City, Glasgow City, North Lanarkshire, and
West Dunbartonshire all have a high percentage of individuals claiming out-of-work
benefits.330 This explains why these authorities voted yes. Employment status results and
voting in the 2014 referendum was also examined.
The results in this thesis showed that unemployed individuals were the most
likely to attribute themselves with a just Scottish identity and the most likely to support
Scottish independence. Individuals who were retired were the most likely to attribute
themselves with a dual national identity and the mostly likely to support devolution over
independence. This proved to be the case on the day of the referendum. According to
studies conducted Lord Ashcroft and the Telegraph, most individuals who were
unemployed at the time of the referendum voted yes.331 Individuals who were retired at
the time of the referendum voted no.332 Polling data was also used to determine if the
results of this thesis, in regards to religion, were in line with how people voted in the
referendum.
The results of this thesis showed all religious groups under study had a higher
percentage of individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity
compared to a just Scottish identity. As a result, all religious groups had a higher
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percentage of individuals that supported devolution compared to those that supported
independence. From this data, it would be expected that on the day of the referendum, all
religious groups should have voted no. A study conducted by the Daily Record
newspaper found that the majority of individuals belonging to the Church of Scotland
voted no. More specifically, 59.1 percent voted no, whereas 40.9 percent voted yes.
However, the study found that not all religious groups voted no. For Roman Catholicism,
56 percent voted yes, whereas 44 percent voted no.333 The majority of Catholics in
Scotland live in economically disadvantaged areas and as Ayres points out, there is a
positive correlation between individuals voting yes and out-of-work claimants.334 This
positive correlation explains why most Catholics voted yes.
Political party preferences and voting in the 2014 referendum was also examined.
It was found that all political parties possessed a higher percentage of individuals that
attributed themselves with a dual national identity compared to a just Scottish identity. It
is important to note, however, that the Scottish National Party had the most affiliated
individuals that attributed themselves with a just Scottish identity compared to the other
political parties. The results also indicated that all political parties, except for the Scottish
National Party, had more affiliated individuals that supported devolution compared to
those that supported independence leading up to the 2014 referendum. As was mentioned
in the results, dual national identity did not cause Scottish National party individuals to
support devolution over independence. It would be assumed then that on the day of the
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referendum, all parties, except the Scottish National Party, would have a higher
percentage of affiliated individuals voting no. When evaluating a study conducted by The
Guardian, this turned out to be the case. The Labour Party, the Conservative Party, and
the Liberal-Democrats all had a higher percentage of affiliated individuals that voted no,
whereas the Scottish National Party had a high percentage of affiliated individuals that
voted yes.335 Thus, although most individuals affiliated with political parties voted no,
individuals affiliated with the Scottish National Party voted yes to independence,
matching the findings provided in this thesis.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

Nationalism is defined by Anthony D. Smith as an ideological movement that
attempts to attain and maintain autonomy, unity, and identity for a population where
some of its peoples believe they constitute a nation.336 Nationalism can arise when its
citizens idealize the state, have a feeling of national superiority, have an uncritical
acceptance of the nation-state and its political institutions, suppress ambivalent feelings
towards the nation-state, overemphasis national association in the self-concept of
individuals in the nation-state, and use derogating comparisons with individuals that are
not considered to be part of the nation-state.337 There are two types of nationalism.338
They are civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism. Civic nationalism involves bringing
together distinct ethnic populations to create a territorial national. Scottish nationalism is
an example of civic nationalism.339 Ethnic nationalism arises in nations that are
comprised of ‘kinsmen.’340 In addition to these two types of nationalism, many European
states have been experiencing a surge in regional nationalism.341
This surge in regional nationalism, or regionalism, has been noted in studies by
Brigid Laffan, Anthony Smith, Michael Keating, and Benedict Anderson.342 Regionalism
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can have many different meanings. Individuals can exhibit regionalism if they feel
threatened by the nation-state, feel separated from the rest of the population, or disagree
with how the state controls their territory. In other instances, regionalism can occur when
individuals aim to re-establish historic identities and autonomies.343Similar to general
nationalism, there are two types of regionalism.
First is institutional regionalism. In many European states in the 1960s, the central
government would create development policies to stimulate development within poorer
regions. These policies ultimately created more powerful and assertive regional
governments in some states, which then increased their calls for greater autonomy from
the central government. This created a rise in regionalism.344 And the second is
autonomist regionalism, which deals with ethnicity, culture, and identity. More
specifically, autonomist regionalism is applied to “state-less nations” where separatist
movements are occurring.345 Although there are two types of regionalism, they both
occur for three reasons.
Firstly, regionalism can occur when there is a lack of support for the centralist
model of government in some regions. Secondly, regionalism can occur when individuals
in regions feel that their territory is different from the rest of the nation-state. And thirdly,
regionalism can occur when individuals within a region see themselves as having a
different national identity than the rest of the individuals in the nation-state.346 The
concept of national identity is related to nationalism and regionalism. It occurs when
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individuals form a positive bond with their nation-state.347 National identity can also exist
in regions of a nation-state, also called stateless nations.
In stateless nations, individuals can possess a national identity that reflects their
loyalty to the region.348 For example, although Scotland is part of the United Kingdom,
some individuals in Scotland see themselves as being just Scottish. However, some in
Scotland see themselves as being both Scottish and British because dual national
identities can arise in regions within nation-states.349 Dual national identities can also
arise when the central government begins to devolve power to regional governments.350
In the United Kingdom, devolution is the transfer of power from the central
government in London to regional governments in Wales, Scotland, and Northern
Ireland.351 Although Westminster has been slowly devolving power to Scotland, the most
significant period of devolution occurred after 1999. Prior to this, with the help of the
Liberal-Democrats in 1993, the Labour Party under Tony Blair proposed further
devolving power to Scotland, which involved creating a Scottish Parliament.352 The plan
for further devolution was part of the Labour Party’s new election strategy, called “New
Labour, New Britain.”353 This then became part of the party’s manifesto in 1997.354 The
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introduction of the Scotland Bill in 1997 would pave the way for further devolution and
the creation of the Scottish Parliament.355 The Bill would be passed in 1998 and the
Scottish Parliament would be founded in 1999.356
This thesis set out to determine if Blair’s devolution to Scotland has resulted in an
increase in individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity in the postdevolution period. To further examine how devolution was impacting national identity, a
breakdown of seven key demographic categories were assessed. These variables included
age, gender, education, location, employment status, religion, and political party
preference. This thesis also set out to determine if individuals that attribute themselves
with a dual national identity are less likely to support Scottish independence. Again, to
further evaluate this, a breakdown of the seven key demographic categories listed above
were assessed. A comparison of national identity in the pre- and post-devolution periods
was also conducted. However, due to data limitations, 1992 was the first year evaluated
in the comparison. This research is important because as the 2014 Scottish Independence
Referendum showed, there are still individuals that wish to see Scotland become its own
independent country. If the British government wishes to keep the Union together,
devolution may be the tool required to achieve that aim.
To conduct this research, this thesis utilized Scottish Social Attitude Surveys from
ScotCen Social Research. These surveys were provided by What Scotland Thinks. The
surveys are conducted through one-on-one interviews. Using the Moreno Question,
respondents were asked “Are you Scottish, not British; more Scottish than British;
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equally Scottish and British; more British than Scottish; or British, not Scottish.”357 As
was previously stated, for the purposes of this thesis, “more Scottish than British; equally
Scottish and British; and more British than Scottish,” were combined into one category
called dual national identity. Respondents were also asked about their feelings towards
independence.
Individuals were asked if they feel Scotland should be “independent, separate
from the United Kingdom and the European Union; independent, separate from the
United Kingdom but in the European Union; part of the United Kingdom, with an elected
Parliament that has some taxation powers; part of the United Kingdom, with an elected
Parliament that has no taxation powers; or part of the United Kingdom without its own
elected Parliament.”358 For the purpose of this thesis, individuals that selected
“independent, separate from the United Kingdom and the European Union” and
“independent, separate from the United Kingdom but in the European Union” were
combined into one category called “independence from the United Kingdom.” This thesis
also combined individuals that selected “part of the United Kingdom, with an elected
Parliament that has some taxation powers” and “part of the United Kingdom with an
elected Parliament that has no taxation powers” into one category called “devolution.”
The category of “part of the United Kingdom without its own elected Parliament was
renamed to “no devolution.”
357
358
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Using Scottish Social Attitude Surveys, this thesis was able to show that since
1999, or the post-devolution period, dual national identity in Scotland has been higher
than just Scottish identity. When looking at the demographic categories of age, gender,
education, location, employment status, religion, and political party preference, each
category had a higher percentage of individuals that attributed themselves with a dual
national identity compared to those that attributed themselves with a just Scottish
identity. Scholars who study national identity in Catalonia have also found similar results.
According to Luis Moreno and Ana Arriba, in the post-devolution period, there were
more individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national identity than there were
individuals that attributed themselves with a just Catalan identity.359 The rise of dual
national identity is important because these individuals are less likely to support
independence compared to their exclusive identity counterparts.360
In the case of Scotland, this thesis found that individuals that attributed
themselves with a dual national identity were less likely to support independence
compared to their just Scottish identity counterparts. The only case where most of the
individuals attributed themselves with a dual national identity, but still supported
independence, were individuals that affiliated themselves with the Scottish National
Party. It is important to note that the results of this thesis, for the most part, lined up with
how people actually voted in the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum. This shows
that because there is a higher percentage of individuals that attribute themselves with a
dual national identity and that these individuals are less likely to support independence,
there is a greater chance of maintaining the unity of the United Kingdom. Also, the
359
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percentage of individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity was also
higher than the percentage of individuals that attribute themselves with a just Scottish
identity prior to 1999. This may have been due to the fact that Westminster has been
devolving small amounts of power to Scotland. An example of this was the creation of
the Scottish Office.361
The results of this thesis are significant because they showed that devolution can
lead to a decrease in feelings towards independence by increasing the number of
individuals that attribute themselves with a dual national identity. It is important to note
that future research could take into account for gradual temporal changes in national
identity and feelings towards independence in the pre- and post-devolution periods.
However, due to data limitations, the first year in this comparison would have to be 1992.
Knowing this, the British government can use further devolution to ensure the Union
remains intact. The results of this thesis are also significant because they both validate
that devolved political institutions are impacting national identity and confirm the Labour
Party’s belief that devolution would lead to a decrease in Scottish nationalism.
As was mentioned previously, new institutionalism studies how political
institutions can affect the behaviour of individual actors and society as a whole.362 It is
apparent from the results in this thesis that the creation of political institutions,
particularly the Scottish Parliament, impacted national identity in Scotland. More
specifically, devolution in Scotland has led to more individuals attributing themselves
with a dual national identity and these individuals are less likely to support Scottish
361
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independence. As was mentioned above, this means that it is more likely that the United
Kingdom will remain united. This is in accordance to the Labour Party’s view on the
effects of devolution. Unlike the Conservative Party, which believes that devolution
would lead to the breakup of the United Kingdom, the Labour Party viewed devolution as
a way to keep the Union together. However, another threat to the Union has presented
itself recently. That threat came in the form of Brexit.
In 1957, the European Economic Community, the precursor for the European
Union, was founded after the signing of the Treaty of Rome by West Germany, France,
Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Italy. The idea behind this community was
that if these nations traded together, they would be less likely to go to war with one
another. The United Kingdom would be late in joining this community. On its first
attempt to join the European Economic Community in 1963, the United Kingdom was
blocked by a veto from French President Charles de Gaulle. De Gaulle feared that if the
United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community, English would replace
French as the main language of the Community. In 1973, the United Kingdom was
successful in joining the European Economic Community.363
Since joining the European Economic Community, the United Kingdom has
increased its trade with European states, consequently benefiting its economy. In 1976,
three years after joining the European Economic Community, British exports to European
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Economic Community member states increased to approximately 29 percent.364 In 2013,
with the enlargement of what is now the European Union, British exports to member
states had reached approximately 52 percent.365 In 2014, however, British exports to the
European Union dropped slightly to 48 percent.366
The biggest benefactors in the United Kingdom in terms of trade with the
European Union are small and medium sized companies. In 2012, these companies
exported approximately 87 percent of their products into the European Union. This is a
vast difference compared to these same companies’ exports to BRIC countries (Brazil,
Russia, India, and China). In 2012, these companies exported approximately 13 percent
of their products to BRIC countries.367 In addition, the United Kingdom also benefits
from European Union membership through international free trade agreements. These
free trade agreements eliminate tariff barriers between third party countries and all
member states.368 In 2006, the European Union made up approximately 43 percent of all
global trade.369 The service sector also benefits from membership in the European Union.
In 2015, services exports from the United Kingdom to the European Union made up
about 40 percent of all services exported by the United Kingdom. During this same
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period, the United Kingdom posted a services trade surplus with the European Union.
Without this, the United Kingdom’s current account deficit, with is the difference
between what the country earns and what it invests and consumes, would be twice as
large.370 Despite these economic benefits, the United Kingdom would hold a referendum
on European Union membership on June 23rd, 2016.
Prior to announcing the referendum, then Conservative Prime Minister David
Cameron entered into prolonged discussions with Brussels on Britain’s current
membership conditions in the European Union.371 At these negotiations, Cameron made
four key demands. The first demand was to allow the United Kingdom to opt out from
the European Union’s founding desire to build an “ever closer union.” This would
prevent the United Kingdom from being drawn into further political integration within
the European Union. The second demand was that European Union migrants who wish to
claim tax credits and child benefits must live and contribute to the United Kingdom for a
minimum of four years. In addition to this, Cameron also wanted provisions that would
prevent European Union migrant workers in the United Kingdom from sending child
benefits or tax credits back to their home country. The third demand was to have the
European Union recognize that the euro is not the only currency within the Eurozone and
to ensure that countries outside the Eurozone are not disadvantaged. Cameron also added
that he wanted safeguards put in place that would prevent the furthering of the financial
union on non-Eurozone states and allow the United Kingdom to opt out of contributing to
Eurozone bailouts. The last demand was to reduce excessive regulation and extending the
370
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single market.372 Although Cameron had to compromise on some of these demands, he
was able to secure the European Union reform deal. After reaching the deal, Cameron
kept his 2015 election promise and announced that the United Kingdom would hold a
referendum on whether or not to leave the European Union.373
The referendum was scheduled to be held on June 23rd, 2016.374 Following the
announcement, many Members of Parliament and other prominent political officials
started to back either the “remain” campaign or the “leave” campaign. The remain
campaign, which was official called the Stronger In, was supported by politicians such as
David Cameron, Leader of the Opposition and Leader of the Labour Party Jeremy
Corbyn, the former Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer and First Secretary of
State George Osborne, and former Prime Ministers Tony Blair and John Major.375
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The leave campaign, which was official called Vote Leave, had the support of former
London Mayor and current Conservative Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs Boris Johnson, Labour Party member Kate Hoey, and former
Leader of the UK Independence Party Nigel Farage.376 On June 23rd, 2016, the people of
the United Kingdom would vote to leave the European Union.377
However, not all parts of the United Kingdom wanted to leave the European
Union. In Scotland, 61.9 percent voted to remain, while 37.9 percent voted to leave.
Scotland had a lower voter turnout compared to Wales and England, who both voted to
leave the European Union.378
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Upset that Scotland voted to remain, but Conservative Prime Minister Theresa May still
triggered Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty, which gives any European Union member the
right to leave unilaterally, Scotland’s First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, confirmed her
intention of holding a second Scottish Independence Referendum.379
At a press conference at Bute House, the official residence of the Scottish First
Minister, Sturgeon stated that an independence referendum would be needed after the
results of Brexit in order to ensure that the future of Scotland is decided by the Scottish
people. This call for a new independence referendum sparked criticism from Theresa
May, who stated that “Instead of playing politics with the future of our country, the
Scottish government should focus on delivering good government and public services for
the people of Scotland. Politics is not a game.” According to Section 30 of the Scotland
Act, for a referendum to take place, the Scottish Parliament must get the approval of
Westminster. Although May was upset by the referendum announcement, she did not rule
out allowing one to take place. Some news outlets have stated that a referendum will
likely take place after the United Kingdom has left the European Union.380 As these two
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political leaders clash over the referendum, some polls suggest that many Scots do not
approve of a second independence referendum.
According to John Curtice, the Brexit vote did nothing to “shift the balance of
opinion on Scotland’s constitutional status.” Curtice found that commitment to the
European Union among Scots is relatively weak. He found that 56 percent of individuals
that voted to remain want the European Union to have less power. Also, he also found
that 74 percent of those that voted no in the 2014 Scottish Independence Referendum
who backed remain in the European Union would vote no again in a second
referendum.381 The results of this thesis support Curtice’s statement that a second
Scottish independence referendum would result in a no victory. Unlike Curtice however,
this thesis will use the argument of national identity to make its case.
This thesis found that individuals that attributed themselves with a dual national
identity, meaning that they associated themselves with being both Scottish and British,
were the least likely to support Scottish independence. With this in mind, it means that
even if a person feels slightly British, they will be less likely to support Scottish
independence compared to just Scottish individuals. This proved to be the case in the
2014 Scottish Independence Referendum. Using data provided by Charles Pattie, a
Professor at the University of Sheffield, and Ron Johnson, a Professor at the University
of Bristol, this thesis would speculate that because Scots feel more British than European
(52 percent of those surveyed claimed to be “more British than European,” whereas only
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30 percent claimed to be “more European than British”),382 they would rather remain part
of the United Kingdom than the European Union and therefore, would vote to remain in a
second Scottish independence referendum.
In addition, various polls and news agencies have reported that many Scots do
not agree with Sturgeon on having another independence referendum.383 Although most
polls found that the majority of Scots do not want a second referendum, the distributions
vary. A poll conducted by YouGov found that 49 percent of Scots did not approve of a
second independence referendum, whereas 37 percent did approved.384 A Kanter poll
found that 46 percent of Scots did not want a second referendum, whereas 26 percent
did.385 A BMG study found that 56 percent of Scots did not approve of a second
referendum, whereas 44 percent did.386
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To determine if the speculation made in this thesis is correct, a future survey
would need to be conducted, using the Moreno question, to see if individuals that
attribute themselves with a dual national identity are still less likely to support Scottish
independence after the Brexit vote. All in all, because of that absence of data, a future
survey that employs the Moreno question is needed to determine if the speculation made
in this thesis is correct.
The impending second Scottish independence referendum shows that identity
politics and Scotland’s place in the United Kingdom will, most likely, remain part of
political debate in the future. The success of the Scottish National Party in the 2007,
2011, and 2016 Scottish elections, as well as the recent council elections, shows that
Scots are still concerned about their identity and their place in the Union.387 However, as
this thesis showed, if the British government continues to devolve power to Scotland, it is
likely that dual national identity will increase, meaning that Scotland will remain part of
the United Kingdom for many more years to come.
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